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I. Introduction 
The government owes us nothing. That is, the Constitution 
does not require the government to protect us or to provide 
services.1 Instead, the Constitution restricts the government from 
                                                                                                     
 1. See SOTIRIOS BARBER, WELFARE AND THE CONSTITUTION 23 (2003) 
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acting.2 For example, citizens enjoy the sense of security provided 
by their local police force, but the police are not constitutionally 
obligated to respond to every emergency call.3 As a corollary to 
this “no-duty” rule, state actors generally cannot be liable for 
inaction.4 Plaintiffs who sue the state on an affirmative-duty 
based claim face a formidable challenge, and yet plaintiffs 
frequently assert the claims.5 
The no-duty rule is not without exception. In Youngberg v. 
Romeo,6 the Supreme Court ruled that states7 owe involuntarily 
committed state-hospital patients affirmative duties of care, 
protection, and rehabilitation.8 In the 1970s and 1980s, the Court 
also recognized affirmative duties for prisoners,9 for pre-trial 
detainees,10 and for arrestees.11 But in DeShaney v. Winnebago 
County Department of Social Services,12 the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                     
(explaining that the negative-liberties model of the Constitution provides no 
basis for substantive benefits). 
 2. Id. 
 3. See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 760–61 (2005) 
(stating that states have discretion in exercising their police functions). 
 4. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 
196–97 (1989) (“[T]he State cannot be held liable under the [Due Process] 
Clause for injuries that could have been averted had it chosen to provide 
them.”).  
 5.  See 1 MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS AND 
DEFENSES § 3.09[D] (4th ed. 2012) (“[Section] 1983 claimants continue to file 
large numbers of due process duty to protect claims.”). 
 6. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316–17 (1982) (ruling that 
states owe affirmative duties under substantive due process to involuntarily 
committed individuals). 
 7. This Note uses the term “state” to include state and local entities and 
their agents.  
 8. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 316–17.  
 9. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (establishing that, under 
the Eighth Amendment, states owe affirmative duties to provide medical care to 
prisoners). 
 10. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979) (establishing states’ 
affirmative duty to provide safe conditions to pretrial detainees).  
 11. See City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983) 
(establishing states’ affirmative duty to provide emergency medical care to 
persons under arrest). 
 12. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 
191 (1989) (holding that the state’s failure to protect an individual from private 
harm did not violate the Due Process Clause). 
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sharply cabined liability premised on affirmative-duty theories 
and fortified the general no-duty rule.13 Nonetheless, DeShaney 
reiterated Youngberg’s rule that involuntary patients enjoy 
affirmative rights.14 And circuit courts generally interpret 
DeShaney as creating a rule that affirmative duties arise in three 
discrete scenarios: (1) formal custody; (2) functional custody; and 
(3) state-created danger.15  
State hospitals present a unique context for analyzing 
affirmative duties. Unlike criminal custodial settings, state laws 
set forth procedures for people to either voluntarily enter state 
hospitals or to be involuntarily committed.16 The “voluntary” and 
“involuntary” labels seem, at first blush, to describe a particular 
patient’s relationship to the state: Involuntary patients are held 
against their will, and voluntary patients fully consent to 
hospitalization. The “voluntary” label often provides a faulty 
description, however, because state-hospital patients may lack 
competency to give informed consent, and coercive forces may 
taint their consent.17 
This Note focuses on affirmative duties to voluntary state-
hospital patients.18 If the state involuntarily commits a patient, 
formally taking custody, then the state has an affirmative duty to 
                                                                                                     
 13. See PETER IRONS, BRENNAN VS. REHNQUIST 107 (1994) (“The Court went 
out of its way to decide the DeShaney case. . . . Rehnquist’s majority opinion in 
the case suggests that he wanted to send a message to federal judges.”). 
 14. See id. at 199 (discussing established affirmative-duty contexts). 
 15. See infra Part II.C.1 (discussing the functional custody exception); infra 
Part II.C.2 (discussing the state-created danger exception). For clarity, in this 
Note, “formal custody” refers to incarceration, involuntary commitment, pre-
trial detention, and arrest. “Functional custody” refers to analogous situations 
in which the state, through affirmative acts, creates a custodial relationship. 
“State-created danger” refers to situations in which the state acts either to 
create a danger or to render an individual more vulnerable to a danger. 
 16. See infra Part III.A (reviewing commitment laws). 
 17. See infra Part V (raising concerns with the voluntary distinction). 
 18. This Note uses the terms “mental health patient” and “state-hospital 
patient” to refer to individuals receiving inpatient treatment in state-operated 
psychiatric facilities, either voluntarily or involuntarily. Patients in private 
facilities are outside this Note’s scope. Private facilities and employees generally 
are not state actors, and therefore are not subject to § 1983. See Civil Action for 
Deprivation of Rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (imposing liability against state 
actors). 
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protect and care for that person.19 But what about voluntary 
patients? Circuits are split on this question.20 Does the state owe 
different obligations to patients based simply on a formal 
status—voluntary or involuntary?21 What if state law allows a 
facility to hold a voluntary patient for seventy-two hours after the 
patient decides he wants to leave?22 What if a voluntary patient is 
so psychiatrically ill that state law forbids discharge?23 What if 
the hospital knows that a patient is likely to harm another 
patient?24  
Courts disagree on how to answer these questions.25 Circuits 
generally take one of two approaches: (1) a strict status-based 
test, using an individual’s formal “voluntary” or “involuntary” 
status to determine if the state owes affirmative duties,26 or (2) a 
fact-intensive inquiry of whether the individual was truly a 
voluntary patient when the harm occurred.27 Both analyses, 
however, emphasize the individual’s commitment status—
voluntary or involuntary—as the chief element.28 
Should courts employ the voluntary/involuntary distinction 
as the engine driving the analytic train? This Note argues: No. 
First, the distinction may amount to an artificial signifier. 
Affirmative duty analysis seeks to understand the relationship 
                                                                                                     
 19. See infra notes 67–71 and accompanying text (discussing Youngberg).  
 20. See infra Part IV (reviewing the circuit split). 
 21. See infra Part IV.A.2 (discussing the First Circuit’s decision in 
Monahan v. Dorchester Counseling Ctr., 961 F.2d 987 (1st Cir. 1992)). 
 22. See infra Part IV.B.3 (discussing the Third Circuit’s decision in Torisky 
v. Schweiker, 446 F.3d 438 (3d Cir. 2006)).  
 23. See infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing the Eighth Circuit’s decisions in 
Kennedy v. Schafer, 71 F.3d 292 (8th Cir. 1996), and Shelton v. Ark. Dep’t 
Human Servs., 677 F.3d 837 (8th Cir. 2012)).  
 24. See infra Part IV.A.3 (discussing the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Walton 
v. Alexander, 44 F.3d 1297 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc)).  
 25. See infra Part IV (analyzing the different approaches circuit courts take 
in analyzing affirmative duties to state-hospital patients).  
 26. See infra Part IV.A (reviewing cases that adopt a status-based 
analysis). 
 27. See infra Part IV.B (discussing cases that adopt a fact-based analysis). 
 28. See infra notes 234–41, 210–11, 257–58, 280, 303–06, 340–41 and 
accompanying text (discussing the circuit courts’ focus on the voluntary 
distinction).  
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and course of dealings between the petitioner and the state.29 
While the labels “voluntary” and “involuntary” superficially 
signal whether a patient’s admission is a product of consent or of 
confinement, these labels can be misleading.30 Second, the 
voluntary distinction loses sight of alternative bases for 
affirmative rights. When courts focus on whether a state-hospital 
patient is voluntary, either by status or de facto, the court may 
overlook or neglect to explore fully the functional custody and 
state-created danger exceptions.31 
This Note puts forth an alternative analytic structure for 
deciding whether state-hospital patients can establish that the 
state owed affirmative Youngberg duties.32 Beginning with the 
presumption that the state owes no affirmative duty,33 the court 
next considers each DeShaney exception in turn. First, if an 
individual is committed involuntarily, then Youngberg duties 
exist based on formal custody. Second, if an individual is a 
voluntary patient, then Youngberg duties exist if the state 
exercises functional custody by restricting the person’s liberty. 
Third, if an individual is a voluntary patient, then Youngberg 
duties exist if the state creates or increases a danger threatening 
the individual. 
Part I of this Note introduces the issues to be addressed. Part 
II reviews substantive due process and its general role in 
restricting government action. Part II then analyzes Youngberg 
and DeShaney before briefly reviewing the current state of 
affirmative duty law, including both the functional custody and 
the state-created danger doctrines. Part III focuses on mental 
health law, providing a background on the laws governing 
                                                                                                     
 29. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986) (explaining that the 
Fourteenth Amendment governs the relationship between individuals and state 
governments). 
 30. See infra Part V.A (examining competency and coercion in voluntary 
admissions).  
 31. See infra notes 266, 339–42 and accompanying text (discussing the 
circuits’ focus on voluntariness, rather than on functional custody or state-
created danger); infra notes 214–20 and accompanying text (discussing Judge 
Suhreinrich’s concurrence in Higgs, which argued that the majority should have 
considered functional custody and state-created danger). 
 32. Infra Part VI. 
 33. See infra Part VI.A (containing this Note’s recommended analysis). 
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voluntary and involuntary admission and on the state hospital 
context in light of recent historical trends. Part IV reviews the 
circuit split over whether voluntary state-hospital patients are 
owed affirmative duties. Part V raises concerns about circuits’ 
focus on the voluntary/involuntary distinction. This Note 
concludes in Part VI by proposing an analysis for approaching 
affirmative duties in the state hospital context, arguing that this 
approach gives appropriate weight to voluntary/involuntary 
issues, retains doctrinal integrity, and will not overburden 
states.  
II. Substantive Due Process and Affirmative Duties 
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects 
individuals from unreasonable or oppressive government 
action.34 State actors violate an individual’s substantive due 
process rights if they act so unreasonably or so oppressively that 
no amount of procedural protections could justify their action.35 
The scope of these substantive rights, however, is quite limited.36 
Constitutional law does not remedy every state actor’s wrong.37 
Due process of law originated in English law as a legal 
maxim meant to restrain the sovereign.38 At common law, the 
substantive prong protected property and contract rights.39 
American jurisprudence continued recognizing due process as a 
“significant constitutional limitation[]” on executive and 
                                                                                                     
 34. See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331 (explaining that the Due Process Clause 
provides procedural and substantive protections against government action 
depriving individuals of life, liberty, or property in an arbitrary or oppressive 
manner). This Note focuses only on the substantive prong of due process. 
 35. Id.  
 36. Id.  
 37. See id. at 332 (“[The Constitution] does not purport to supplant 
traditional tort law in laying down rules of conduct to regulate liability for 
injuries that attend living together in society.”). 
 38. See JOHN V. ORTH, DUE PROCESS OF LAW: A BRIEF HISTORY 7, 9 (2003) 
(discussing the Magna Carta’s guarantee that “the law of the land” safeguards 
individual rights).  
 39. See id. at 98–102 (summarizing the common law roots of due process 
and the doctrine’s evolution in American jurisprudence). 
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legislative power.40 Over time, the doctrine evolved, with 
substantive due process now protecting individual interests 
“relating to marriage, family, procreation, and the right to bodily 
integrity.”41 The Court has long held that individuals possess a 
fundamental right to personal autonomy,42 including in a medical 
setting.43 
Patients who suffer some injury while in a state hospital may 
claim that the state violated their substantive due process 
rights.44 Due process rights may be vindicated via claims brought 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.45 And in the last few decades, § 1983 has 
“emerged as a potent weapon for state hospital patients.”46 These 
constitutional claims are popular for mental health advocates 
seeking “system-wide changes,” because § 1983 actions offer 
injunctive relief and legal fees in addition to compensatory 
damages.47  
                                                                                                     
 40. Id. at 9. 
 41. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 272 (1994) (plurality opinion).  
 42. See Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (“No right is 
held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded . . . than the right of every 
individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint 
or interference of others.”).  
 43. See Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) 
(“Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine 
what shall be done with his own body.”). The Supreme Court has adopted Judge 
Cardozo’s articulation in Schloendorff of the individual’s right to control his 
body from unwanted medical intervention. Cruzan v. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 
U.S. 261, 269 (1990). 
 44. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”). 
 45. See Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of 
the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights . . . secured by 
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured. 
 46. See PAUL S. APPELBAUM & THOMAS G. GUTHEIL, CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF 
PSYCHIATRY & THE LAW 137 (4th ed. 2007) (discussing how mental health 
advocates began using civil rights actions under § 1983 in the late twentieth 
century to achieve social reform).  
 47. See id. at 138 (explaining why the remedies available pursuant to a 
§ 1983 claim may be more attractive than state law tort remedies when legal 
advocates hope to effect broad change in state hospitals). 
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This Part first reviews the doctrine of substantive due 
process. Generally, this doctrine restricts, rather than mandates, 
government action.48 Then, this Part reviews the two Supreme 
Court cases governing when a state owes affirmative duties to 
state-hospital patients: Youngberg and DeShaney.49 Finally, this 
Part summarizes the affirmative-duty rules that circuit courts 
have developed after DeShaney.50 
A. Substantive Due Process: A Charter of Negative Duties  
Substantive due process foists negative duties on the 
government, curtailing its power.51 Judge Posner, writing for the 
Seventh Circuit, articulated the Fourteenth Amendment’s scope 
in a case involving a dangerous, mentally ill person who—
subsequent to being released by the state—murdered the 
plaintiff’s decedent: 
There is a constitutional right not to be murdered by a state 
officer, for the state violates the Fourteenth Amendment when 
its officer, acting under color of state law, deprives a person of 
life without due process of law. But there is no constitutional 
right to be protected by the state against being murdered by 
criminals or madmen. It is monstrous if the state fails to 
protect its residents against such predators but it does not 
violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
or, we suppose, any other provision of the Constitution. The 
Constitution is a charter of negative liberties; it tells the state 
to let people alone; it does not require the federal government 
or the state to provide services, even so elementary a service 
as maintaining law and order.52 
The Supreme Court consistently affirms this characterization of 
the Fourteenth Amendment as “a charter of negative liberties.”53 
                                                                                                     
 48. See infra Part II.A (explaining the general no-duty rule).  
 49. See infra Part II.B (examining Youngberg and DeShaney).  
 50. See infra Part II.C (discussing post-DeShaney developments). 
 51. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 
195 (1989) (“The [Substantive Due Process] Clause is phrased as a limitation on 
the State’s power to act . . . .”). 
 52. Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted).  
 53. See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 126 (1992) 
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B. Affirmative Duty Exceptions: Youngberg and DeShaney 
The general rule that the Due Process Clause imposes 
negative duties is not absolute. In discrete contexts, the Clause 
imposes affirmative duties, calling on the state to proactively 
serve or protect.54  
Circuit courts have labored to define the scope of affirmative 
duties for several decades. In Martinez v. California,55 Justice 
Stevens suggested in dicta that a state might owe an affirmative 
duty of protection if the state (1) becomes aware of a special 
danger threatening a specific individual and (2) indicates a 
willingness to protect that person.56 Many circuits interpreted 
this language to create a “special-relationship” doctrine, whereby 
the government undertakes an obligation to protect persons with 
whom it shares a special relationship.57 These circuits began 
                                                                                                     
(“Neither the text nor the history of the Due Process Clause supports 
petitioner’s claim that the governmental employer’s duty to provide its 
employees with a safe working environment is a substantive component of the 
Due Process Clause.”); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986) (“The 
guarantee of due process has never been understood to mean that the State 
must guarantee due care on the part of its officials.”). 
 54. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198 (“It is true that in certain limited 
circumstances the Constitution imposes upon the State affirmative duties of 
care and protection with respect to particular individuals.”).  
 55. See Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284 (1980) (holding that the 
state was not liable for a murder committed by a parolee five months after the 
state released him). 
 56. See id. at 285  
[T]he parole board was not aware that appellants’ decedent, as 
distinguished from the public at large, faced any special danger. We 
need not and do not decide that a parole officer could never be 
deemed to “deprive” someone of life by action taken in connection 
with the release of a prisoner on parole. 
 57. See, e.g., Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 855 F.2d 1421, 1425–26 (9th 
Cir. 1988) (ruling that the plaintiff’s allegations that the state owed an 
affirmative duty of police protection after the state issued a restraining order 
and received notice of plaintiff’s danger was sufficient to state a claim under the 
special-relationship doctrine); Estate of Bailey v. Cnty. of York, 768 F.2d 503, 
510–11 (3d Cir. 1985) (vacating and remanding the district court’s dismissal of a 
§ 1983 claim and ruling that plaintiff might be able to prove the state violated 
an affirmative duty arising under the special-relationship doctrine); Jones v. 
Phyfer, 761 F.2d 642, 644–45 (11th Cir. 1985) (“What is required in a 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 action is the establishment of a special relationship between the victim 
and the criminal or between the victim and the state, or some showing that the 
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finding affirmative duties grounded in substantive due process 
following Martinez. 
In the context of mental health patients, two Supreme Court 
cases shape the legal doctrine. First, in Youngberg,58 the Court 
held that the government takes on affirmative duties when it 
involuntarily confines a person to a mental health facility.59 
Second, in DeShaney,60 the Court hemmed in the scope of 
affirmative duties.61 
                                                                                                     
victim, as distinguished from the public at large, faced a special danger.”); 
Jensen v. Conrad, 747 F.2d 185, 190–94 & n.11 (4th Cir. 1984) (dictum) 
(examining circuit precedent and concluding that affirmative duties may arise 
out of special relationships, particularly if factors such as legal custody, 
expressed desire by state to help, and state’s knowledge of claimant’s danger are 
present), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985); Fox v. Curtis, 712 F.2d 84, 88 (4th 
Cir. 1983) (stating that “a right and corollary duty may arise out of special 
custodial or other relationships created or assumed by the state in respect of 
particular persons”). But see, e.g., Harpoole v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 820 
F.2d 923, 926–27 (8th Cir. 1987) (analyzing and rejecting the special-
relationship doctrine, and criticizing its reliance on Supreme Court dicta rather 
than statutory text or constitutional principles); Wideman v. Shallowford Cmty. 
Hosp., 826 F.2d 1030, 1035–36 (11th Cir. 1987) (ruling that constitutional 
affirmative duties arise only when the state creates or increases a danger 
through its “exercise of coercion, dominion, or restraint”); Estate of Gilmore v. 
Buckley, 787 F.2d 714, 720–22 (1st Cir. 1986) (noting that the Supreme Court’s 
“vague hints” left “the door slightly ajar” for special-relationship claims, but 
ruling that “the state must be more directly implicated” in causing the harm 
than merely knowing of a special danger), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986). 
 58. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982) (ruling that an 
individual who has been involuntarily committed to a psychiatric hospital 
“enjoys constitutionally protected interests in conditions of reasonable care and 
safety, reasonably nonrestrictive confinement conditions, and such training as 
may be required by these interests”). 
 59. Id.  
 60. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 
191 (1989) (holding that the state’s failure to protect an individual from private 
harm did not violate the Due Process Clause). 
 61. See id. at 196 (“[O]ur cases have recognized that the Due Process 
Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where 
such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which 
the government itself may not deprive the individual.”). 
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1. Youngberg v. Romeo 
In 1982, the Supreme Court first considered whether an 
involuntarily confined mental health patient possesses liberty 
interests under substantive due process in Youngberg v. Romeo.62 
Youngberg involved a “profoundly retarded” thirty-three-year-old 
man who was civilly committed to Pennhurst, a state psychiatric 
facility, because he posed an imminent danger to himself and 
others.63 At Pennhurst, hospital staff proposed a treatment plan 
designed to reduce Mr. Romeo’s aggressive and violent behaviors, 
but never implemented it.64 Mr. Romeo repeatedly suffered 
injuries, some of which were self-inflicted, during the 
hospitalization.65 Mr. Romeo’s mother filed suit against the 
hospital’s directors and supervisors, alleging in part that the 
defendants violated Mr. Romeo’s Fourteenth Amendment Due 
Process rights.66  
The Supreme Court ruled that the State had violated Mr. 
Romeo’s substantive due process rights by not fulfilling its 
affirmative obligation to protect and care for him.67 Justice 
Powell, writing for the majority, analogized involuntary state 
hospitalization to incarceration.68 Just as the state owes 
affirmative duties to prisoners in public prisons, it also owes 
duties to involuntary patients in public hospitals.69 The hospital 
must provide food, shelter, clothing, and medical care to all 
                                                                                                     
 62. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 314. 
 63. Id. at 309–10.  
 64. Id. at 310–11. 
 65. See id. at 310 (stating that petitioner’s complaint alleged that Mr. 
Romeo was injured “on at least sixty-three occasions”).  
 66. Id. 
 67. See id. at 324 (“Respondent thus enjoys constitutionally protected 
interests in conditions of reasonable care and safety, reasonably nonrestrictive 
confinement conditions, and such training as may be required by these 
interests.”). 
 68. Id. at 315.  
 69. See id. at 315–16 (“If it is cruel and unusual punishment to hold 
convicted criminals in unsafe conditions, it must be unconstitutional to confine 
the involuntarily committed—who may not be punished at all—in unsafe 
conditions.”). 
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patients.70 But Mr. Romeo’s rights included more than these basic 
services. The Court ruled that states owe involuntarily committed 
individuals certain rights (Youngberg rights): (1) the right to 
reasonable care and safety; (2) the right to reasonably 
nonrestrictive conditions; and (3) the right to any training or 
rehabilitation associated with these interests.71  
The decision does not address whether Youngberg rights 
extend to voluntary patients. Some lower courts interpreted 
Justice Powell’s opinion as applying to all mental health patients, 
irrespective of the method of admission—voluntary or 
involuntary.72 Additionally, some circuit courts continued finding 
affirmative duties based on Martinez and the special-relationship 
doctrine.73  
In 1989, the Supreme Court revisited its affirmative duty 
rulings in DeShaney, a case set outside of a psychiatric 
institution, but nonetheless broadly addressing the scope and 
nature of substantive due process protections.74 
2. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services 
In DeShaney, the Supreme Court considered whether the 
Substantive Due Process Clause requires states to protect 
                                                                                                     
 70. See id. at 315, 324 (noting in dicta that the State conceded that it owes 
these duties to all state-hospital patients).  
 71. See id. at 314–25 (finding each of these liberty interests). The Court 
further determined that a “professional judgment” standard should apply to 
determine whether the state violated its duties to protect or care for a patient. 
See id. at 321–22 (reasoning that deferring to the hospital clinicians’ judgment 
is appropriate because it allows hospitals to concentrate on treating patients 
according to their individual needs without imposing an onerous blanket rule).  
 72. See Savidge v. Fincannon, 836 F.2d 898, 907 n.44 (5th Cir. 1988) 
(rejecting the argument that Youngberg applies only when an individual has 
been confined through formal proceedings); Ass’n for Retarded Citizens of N.D. 
v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473, 485 (D.N.D. 1982) (“[I]f the plaintiffs had voluntarily 
consented to their admission to the Grafton state school, it would not follow that 
all their rights to liberty under the due process clause were waived.”), aff’d and 
remanded, 713 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1983). 
 73. See supra note 57 (listing pre-DeShaney circuit cases on special 
relationships). 
 74. See infra Part II.B.2 (examining the DeShaney ruling).  
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individuals from private—rather than state-inflicted—harm.75 
DeShaney is not about mental health patients. Joshua DeShaney 
was a four-year-old boy who became involved with Wisconsin’s 
Department of Social Services (DSS) in January 1983 because of 
his father’s abuse.76 During 1983, Joshua was hospitalized three 
times for injuries; hospital staff suspected child abuse each time 
and contacted DSS.77 DSS placed Joshua under the hospital’s 
temporary custody for three days after the first report, but 
returned Joshua to his father’s home three days later, and began 
sending a social worker out to visit the home monthly.78 Over a 
period of a little more than a year, Joshua kept showing up the 
emergency room, injured; the hospital kept reporting the injuries 
to DSS; and DSS kept sending the social worker—and nothing 
more.79 The social worker documented “suspicious injuries on 
Joshua’s head” and “continuing suspicions” that Joshua was 
being physically abused.80 Despite these reports, DSS took no 
further action.81 In March 1984, Joshua went into a life-
threatening coma.82 Emergency surgery revealed brain damage 
resulting from repeated head injuries over a long period.83 Now 
“profoundly retarded,” he would likely spend the rest of his life in 
an institution.84 Joshua’s mother sued DSS on his behalf, alleging 
that DSS knew of or should have reasonably known about the 
abuse, and so the State violated Joshua’s due process rights by 
failing to protect him.85  
                                                                                                     
 75. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 
194 (1989) (characterizing the issue presented as “when, if ever, the failure of a 
state or local governmental entity or its agents to provide an individual with 
adequate protective services constitutes a violation of the individual’s due 
process rights”). 
 76. Id. at 192–93. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 193. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 193–94. 
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The Supreme Court disagreed. Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
writing for the majority, analyzed the scope of substantive due 
process and the nature of its protections. The majority began its 
analysis with the principle that the Due Process Clause functions 
as a limitation on the government.86 The Clause restricts the 
government—it does not empower the government by requiring 
states to protect society or provide services.87 From this premise, 
the majority reasoned that a state cannot be liable for private 
violence because states have no duty to protect against this 
violence.88 Youngberg, according to the majority, “stand[s] for the 
proposition that when [a] State takes a person into its custody 
and holds him there against his will, the Constitution imposes 
upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for 
his safety and general well-being.”89 
The Court also expressly rejected the argument that 
affirmative duties might derive from a special relationship.90 The 
special-relationship doctrine implied that affirmative duties arise 
from the state’s knowledge of danger and its indicated willingness 
to help.91 Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed out that the doctrine’s 
analysis misconstrues the nature and purpose of affirmative 
duties, which are meant to protect individuals from harms caused 
                                                                                                     
 86. See id. at 194–96 (reviewing the Clause’s text, history, and supporting 
doctrine).  
 87. See id. at 196 (“The Due Process Clauses generally confer no 
affirmative right to governmental aid.”). Some scholars criticize Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s interpretation of the Due Process Clause, arguing that it 
“fundamentally distorts the meaning . . . by abstracting the language from its 
historical context.” Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty of Government: Protection, 
Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 41 DUKE L.J. 507, 561 (2001). In his 
Article, Professor Heyman analyzes the Fourteenth Amendment’s origins from 
English law, as well as the congressional debates and framers’ intentions in 
adopting the Amendment. Id. He concludes that the view that the Due Process 
Clause provides only negative duties is “indefensible, and that the history of the 
Fourteenth Amendment in no way forecloses recognition of a constitutional 
right to protection.” Id. at 512. 
 88. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196–97. 
 89. Id. at 199–200. Justice Brennan criticized this characterization of 
Youngberg in his dissent. Infra notes 103–04 and accompanying text. 
 90. See id. at 197–98 (discussing the special-relationship argument 
advanced here by petitioners and accepted in several circuit courts after 
Martinez, but ultimately rejecting the argument). 
 91. Id. at 197 n.4. 
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by affirmative state acts that render people unable to act on their 
own behalf.92 Without affirmative state action, duties will not 
arise.93 
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, 
dissented and criticized the majority’s analytic posture.94 Justice 
Brennan did not disagree that, as a general principle, the Due 
Process Clause imposes no obligation on the government to 
provide services.95 But the majority’s “initial fixation” with this 
principle led it astray.96 Approaching affirmative-duty claims 
with “suspicion,” the majority framed the case as one about 
inaction: the state’s failure to protect Joshua.97 Any actions that 
the state did take became tangentially important.98 To the 
majority, the question was whether a state should be liable for 
inaction. The majority viewed the facts through a skewed lens.99 
Focusing in on what did not happen—the ways the state did not 
exercise custody or increase Joshua’s vulnerability, 
“foreshadow[ed]—perhaps even preordain[ed]” the conclusion.100 
Justice Brennan argued that a proper analysis should begin 
differently and ask what actions the state did take.101 
Justice Brennan also took issue with the majority’s 
characterization of Youngberg—that the state owed affirmative 
duties because it confined Mr. Romeo’s liberty through civil 
commitment.102 Justice Brennan asserted that Mr. Romeo’s 
constitutional right did not spring from the government’s prior 
                                                                                                     
 92. Id. at 200. 
 93.  Id. 
 94. Id. at 203–12 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
 95. See id. at 203 (stating that the Court’s precedent supports this 
principle). 
 96. See id. at 205 (stating that the majority’s preoccupation with the 
negative rights principle leaves the majority “unable to appreciate” Court 
precedent related to when affirmative rights arise). 
 97. Id. at 204.  
 98. Id.  
 99. See id. (arguing that the majority’s baseline perspective of no positive 
rights brings about “a concomitant suspicion of any claim that seems to depend 
on such rights”).  
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 205. 
 102. Id. at 206. 
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act of committing him.103 The affirmative duty arose because the 
state “separated him from other sources of aid,” obliging the state 
to provide substitute aid.104 Mr. Romeo was unable to care for 
himself because he was mentally retarded, not because he was 
confined.105  
In a separate dissent, Justice Blackmun highlighted the 
case’s tragic facts, “displaying emotion rarely seen in Supreme 
Court opinions.”106 He argued that the majority’s “sterile 
formalism” in distinguishing between action and inaction was 
inappropriate and marked “a sad commentary on American life, 
and constitutional principles.”107 DSS knew that Joshua was in 
danger, and DSS chose “inaction.”108 The majority, he asserted, 
misread “the broad and stirring Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment,” which were designed to prevent such a rigidly 
formalistic interpretation of the law.109 By adopting this 
formalistic distinction between action and inaction, Justice 
Blackmun alleged, the majority opinion recalled “the antebellum 
judges who denied relief to fugitive slaves.”110 
Despite passionate criticisms in the dissents and from legal 
scholars,111 DeShaney remains good law.112 The Substantive Due 
                                                                                                     
 103. See id. (“This restatement of Youngberg’s holding should come as a 
surprise.”).  
 104. Id.  
 105. Id.  
 106. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CONSERVATIVE ASSAULT ON THE 
CONSTITUTION 184 (2010) (summarizing Justice Blackmun’s dissent).  
 107. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 212–
13 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 108. Id. at 212.  
 109. Id.  
 110. Id.  
 111. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 106, at 182 (arguing that DeShaney 
represents a “particularly troubling” example of how a “conservative attack” on 
the Constitution in recent decades has caused the Supreme Court to limit 
constitutional liberties and protections); Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of 
Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn from Modern Physics, 103 HARV. 
L. REV. 1, 10 (1989) (criticizing the majority’s analysis because its “stilted, pre-
modern paradigm” fails to understand how Wisconsin “may itself have played a 
major role in shaping the world it observes”).  
 112. See infra notes 118–19 (stating that DeShaney remains the Supreme 
Court’s preeminent ruling on affirmative duties under substantive due process). 
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Process Clause does not generally require states to affirmatively 
protect individuals, and so a state is not liable if an individual 
becomes injured after the state fails to protect him.113 DeShaney’s 
tone strongly suggests that it hoped to firmly limit the scope of 
affirmative duties.114 The Chief Justice, however, identified 
several contexts that give rise to affirmative duties on the state: 
(1) in previously enumerated contexts involving formal custody—
incarceration, civil commitment, pre-trial detention, and police 
custody;115 (2) when a state takes an individual into functional 
custody through an affirmative action, restricting that person’s 
ability to protect himself;116 and (3) when a state creates a danger 
or causes an individual to be more vulnerable to a danger.117 
C. Affirmative Duties After DeShaney 
DeShaney remains the Supreme Court’s authoritative ruling 
on affirmative duties under the Substantive Due Process 
Clause.118 The Court has subsequently affirmed DeShaney’s 
                                                                                                     
 113. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196–
97 (1989).  
 114. See id. at 202–03 (remarking that “natural sympathy” pushes judges 
and lawyers to seek compensation for Joshua, but cautioning that the state 
actors “should not have [liability] thrust upon them by this Court’s expansion of 
the Due Process Clause”).  
 115. Id. at 198–99. DeShaney noted that some circuit court precedent also 
includes foster children in this list, but the Court declined to rule on this issue. 
Id. at 201 n.9. Most circuits addressing this issue since DeShaney have ruled 
that states owe affirmative duties to children placed in foster homes. See 
MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ & KATHRYN R. URBONYA, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION 40–41 & 
n.213 (Fed. Judicial Ctr., 2d ed. 2008) (collecting relevant circuit cases).  
 116. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200 (“[I]t is the State’s affirmative act of 
restraining the individual’s freedom to act on his own behalf—through 
incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty—
which is the ‘deprivation of liberty’ triggering the protections of the Due Process 
Clause.” (emphasis added)).  
 117. See id. at 201 (“While the State may have been aware of the dangers 
that Joshua faced in the free world, it played no part in their creation, nor did it 
do anything to render him any more vulnerable to them.” (emphasis added)). 
 118. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Government Duty to Protect: Post-DeShaney 
Developments, 19 TOURO L. REV. 679, 683 (2003) (“DeShaney is the touchstone 
for all subsequent discussions about the affirmative duty to provide protection 
under due process.”).  
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holding,119 expressing its “reluctan[ce] to expand the concept of 
substantive due process because guideposts for responsible 
decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and open-
ended.”120 Expanding due process through judicial decisions 
creates the risk that the judiciary’s policy preferences will define 
the scope of protected liberties.121  
Despite the Court’s self-imposed restraint, it has not scaled 
back established affirmative duties. Since DeShaney, the 
Supreme Court has reiterated that affirmative duties exist in the 
enumerated and recognized contexts of formal confinement—
prisons, pre-trial detainees, arrestees, and “persons in mental 
institutions.”122 The functional custody and state-created danger 
exceptions identified in DeShaney give plaintiffs alternative 
avenues for holding the government constitutionally liable for a 
private harm.123 
In the years since DeShaney came down, circuit courts have 
fashioned different variations on the functional custody and 
state-created danger exceptions.  
                                                                                                     
 119. See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 126–27 (1992) 
(ruling that the Due Process Clause does not impose an affirmative duty on 
municipalities to provide minimal safety levels for employees); Town of Castle 
Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 773 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (calling it 
“perfectly clear” that the Constitution imposes no general obligation on the state 
to provide police protection). 
 120. Collins, 503 U.S. at 125; see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 
702, 720 (1997) (asserting the importance of judicial restraint, because “[b]y 
extending constitutional protection to an asserted right or liberty interest, we, to 
a great extent, place the matter outside the arena of public debate and 
legislative action”). 
 121. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1989) (plurality 
opinion) (calling substantive due process a “treacherous field for this Court” and 
arguing that “history counsels caution and restraint” in identifying new 
substantive liberty interests). 
 122. Collins, 503 U.S. at 127.  
 123. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The State-Created Danger Doctrine, 23 TOURO 
L. REV. 1, 1 (2007) (reviewing the theories available for establishing that the 
government owes an individual an affirmative duty after DeShaney). 
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1. The Functional Custody Exception 
DeShaney suggests that a state acquires an affirmative duty 
to care for and protect an individual when the state acts to 
restrain that person’s liberty.124 Most circuits have subsequently 
interpreted this language in DeShaney as establishing 
affirmative duties when a state takes “functional custody”125 over 
an individual.126  
Circuits generally apply the functional custody exception and 
find an affirmative duty to protect when the state “affirmatively 
places the individual in a position of danger [that] the individual 
would not have otherwise faced.”127 Some circuits explicitly 
require an element of involuntariness: the state must have taken 
custody over the individual against his will.128 The level of control 
                                                                                                     
 124. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 
200 (1989) (“[I]t is the State’s affirmative act of restraining the individual’s 
freedom to act on his own behalf—through incarceration, institutionalization, or 
other similar restraint of personal liberty—which is the ‘deprivation of liberty’ 
triggering the [duty].” (emphasis added)). 
 125. Many courts and scholars refer to the situation in which a state 
restricts an individual’s liberty through an affirmative act as a “special 
relationship.” See, e.g., Patel v. Kent Sch. Dist., 648 F.3d 965, 971 (9th Cir. 
2011) (stating that DeShaney creates a “special relationship exception” when a 
state restricts a person’s liberty such that the person cannot protect himself). To 
avoid confusion with the special-relationship doctrine that arose under 
Martinez—which DeShaney explicitly rejects—this Note uses the term 
“functional custody” to denote situations in which a state’s action restricts a 
person’s liberty and thereby creates a constitutional obligation for the state to 
protect that person. See supra notes 57, 90–92 and accompanying text 
(reviewing the special-relationship exception after Martinez and DeShaney’s 
subsequent rejection of this doctrine). 
 126. See SCHWARTZ & URBONYA, supra note 115, at 40 (discussing functional 
custody).  
 127. Wallace v. Adkins, 115 F.3d 427, 429 (7th Cir. 1997). See also Armigo v. 
Wagon Mound Pub. Schs., 159 F.3d 1253, 1261 (10th Cir. 1998) (“[L]iability may 
attach to a state actor for the violence of a third party if the state restrained the 
plaintiff’s personal liberty and that restraint hindered the plaintiff’s freedom to 
act to protect himself.”). 
 128. See Randolph v. Cervantes, 130 F.3d 727, 730 (5th Cir. 1997) (stating 
that functional custody requires that the state’s action be “involuntary or 
against his will” (internal citations omitted)). See also Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari at 7–8, Kovacic v. Villarreal, No. 10-1235, 2011 WL 1393814, at *7–8 
(Mar. 8, 2011) (requesting clarification on the “swirling, murky waters” of 
functional custody doctrine), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2995 (2011). 
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a state exercises may also affect this analysis, as circuits 
sometimes hinge functional custody on whether the individual 
“depend[ed] completely on the state to satisfy [his] basic human 
needs” and the state’s action prevented other sources of care.129 
Individuals have asserted claims based on functional custody 
in various circumstances and found varying success. Most circuits 
recognize the state’s act of placing a child in foster care to be 
sufficient for establishing affirmative duties.130 By contrast, state 
laws mandating school attendance usually fail to establish 
functional custody—meaning that public schools do not owe 
affirmative duties to students—because the attendance laws do 
not sufficiently restrain the child.131 
                                                                                                     
 129.  Maldonado v. Josey, 975 F.2d 727, 733 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 
507 U.S. 914 (1993).  
 130. See Doe ex rel. Johnson v. S.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 597 F.3d 163, 175 
(4th Cir. 2010) (“We now hold that when a state involuntarily removes a child 
from her home, thereby taking the child into its custody and care, the state has 
taken an affirmative act to restrain the child’s liberty, triggering the 
[affirmative] protections of the Due Process Clause.”); Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 
798, 808 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[W]hen [a] state places a child in state-
regulated foster care, the state has entered into a special relationship with that 
child which imposes upon it certain affirmative duties.”); Norfleet ex rel. 
Norfleet v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 989 F.2d 289, 293 (8th Cir. 1993) (“[A] 
special custodial relationship . . . was created by the state when it took [a child] 
from his caregiver and placed him in foster care.”); Yvonne L. ex rel. Lewis v. 
N.M. Dep’t of Human Servs., 959 F.2d 883, 892–93 (10th Cir. 1992) (finding a 
clearly established right for foster children to be placed in safe conditions); K.H. 
ex rel. Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 853 (7th Cir. 1990) (determining that 
states owe affirmative duties to foster children, reasoning that “[o]nce the state 
assumes custody of a person, it owes him a rudimentary duty of safekeeping no 
matter how perilous his circumstances when he was free”); Meador v. Cabinet 
for Human Res., 902 F.2d 474, 476 (6th Cir. 1990) (“[D]ue process extends the 
right to be free from the infliction of unnecessary harm to children in state-
regulated foster homes.”). 
 131. See, e.g., Doe ex rel. Magee v. Covington Cnty. Sch. Dist. ex rel. 
Keys, 675 F.3d 849, 857 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (“We reaffirm, then, 
decades of binding precedent: a public school does not have a DeShaney 
special relationship with its students requiring the school to ensure the 
students’ safety from private actors.”); Hasenfaus v. LaJeunesse, 175 F.3d 
68, 73–74 (1st Cir. 1999) (concluding that compulsory attendance laws did 
not create an obligation for a school to protect a student from suicide); 
Maldonado, 975 F.2d at 732–33 (“Th[e] amount of freedom on the part of the 
student and the degree of parental involvement and control necessarily 
dictate that the state does not become the primary caretaker simply by 
mandating compulsory school attendance.”). But while compulsory 
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2. The State-Created Danger Exception 
Most circuits also interpret DeShaney as acknowledging a 
“state-created danger exception.”132 This doctrine holds that a 
state assumes affirmative duties to protect a person when the 
state itself creates or increases the danger that ultimately causes 
the person’s harm.133 This theory of liability predated DeShaney 
in some circuits. Judge Posner, who articulated the conception of 
the Constitution as a “charter of negative liberties,” pointed out 
an oft-quoted “snake pit” exception: “[I]f the state puts a man in a 
position of danger from private persons and then fails to protect 
him, it will not be heard to say that its role was merely passive; it 
                                                                                                     
attendance laws may not create a uniform duty for schools to protect all 
students, some circuits have refused to adopt the opposite rule—that schools 
will never be constitutionally obligated to protect students from private harm. 
See Hasenfaus, 175 F.3d at 72 
If [a student] had suffered a heart attack in the classroom, and the 
teacher knew of her peril, could the teacher merely leave her there to 
die without summoning help? If a six-year old child fell down an 
elevator shaft, could the school principal ignore the matter? Of 
course, school officials might be held liable in tort for such omissions, 
but common law liability aside, we hesitate to say for certain that 
substantive due process plays no role. 
 132. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Booker, No. 11-1583, 2012 WL 6604196, at *4 
(10th Cir. Dec. 19, 2012); Pena v. DePrisco, 432 F.3d 98, 109 (1st Cir. 2005) 
(stating that a government actor may be liable if he creates a danger through an 
affirmative act); Butera v. District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637, 651 (D.C. Cir. 
2001) (“We . . . hold[] that, under the State endangerment concept, an individual 
can assert a substantive due process right to protection by the District of 
Columbia from third-party violence when District of Columbia officials 
affirmatively act to increase or create the danger that ultimately results in the 
individual’s harm.”). The Fifth Circuit has rejected the state-created danger 
exception. Beltran v. City of El Paso, 367 F.3d 299, 307 (5th Cir. 2004). The 
First Circuit has discussed and apparently recognized the doctrine, but never 
found resulting liability. See Rivera v. Rhode Island, 402 F.3d 27, 35 (1st Cir. 
2005) (discussing the status of the state-created danger doctrine within the 
circuit). The Fourth Circuit has also discussed the doctrine, but limits 
affirmative duties to facts involving some degree of custody. See Pinder v. 
Johnson, 54 F.3d 1169, 1175 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (“This Court has 
consistently read DeShaney to require a custodial context before any affirmative 
duty can arise under the Due Process Clause.”). 
 133. See Chemerinsky, supra note 123, at 3 (stating that circuits continue 
developing the state-created danger doctrine).  
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is as much an active tortfeasor as if it had thrown him into a 
snake pit.”134  
No uniform test for state-created danger has developed, and 
the Supreme Court, at this point, has declined to weigh in.135 
While circuits have crafted slightly different tests for what 
circumstances constitute state-created danger, their tests 
generally share several elements: (1) the state, through some 
affirmative action, created or increased a risk of harm; (2) the 
plaintiff—as opposed to the general public—must have been 
rendered more vulnerable to the harm; (3) the state must have 
known, or reasonably should have known, about the danger; and 
(4) the state’s conduct must shock the conscience.136  
Circuits continue to settle the general contours of both the 
state-created danger and functional custody exceptions. Context 
clearly plays a central role in both exceptions, and the context of 
voluntary psychiatric hospitalization raises unique concerns, as 
discussed in the next Part. 
                                                                                                     
 134. Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982). Another frequently 
cited illustration from Judge Posner explains, “The state, having saved a man 
from a lynch mob, cannot then lynch him, on the ground that he will be no worse 
off than if he had not been saved.” K.H. ex rel. Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 
849 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 135. See McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 324–25 (5th Cir. 
2002) (reviewing different approaches taken by sister circuits).  
 136. See, e.g., Bright v. Westmoreland Cnty., 443 F.3d 276, 281–82 (3d Cir. 
2006) (laying out the circuit’s test and emphasizing that the state must have 
misused—rather than failed to use—its authority); Armijo v. Wagon Mound 
Pub. Schs. 159 F.3d 1253, 1262–63 (10th Cir. 1998) (“[P]laintiff must show: 
(1) the charged state actors created the danger or increased the plaintiff’s 
vulnerability; (2) the plaintiff [belonged to] a limited and specifically definable 
group; (3) the defendants’ conduct put the plaintiff at substantial risk of serious, 
immediate, and proximate harm; (4) the risk was obvious or known.”); Kallstrom 
v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1067 (6th Cir. 1998) (stating that states 
assume affirmative duties “by substantially increasing the likelihood that a 
private actor would deprive [an individual] of their liberty interest in personal 
security”); Mitchell v. Duval Cnty. Sch. Bd., 107 F.3d 837, 839 (11th Cir. 1997) 
(“In order for a plaintiff to hold the state liable under the ‘special danger’ 
analysis, he must show that the state affirmatively placed him in a position of 
danger which was distinguishable from that of the general public.”). 
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III. The Landscape of Mental Health Law and Public Psychiatric 
Hospitalization 
This Part begins by reviewing the general laws governing 
voluntary and involuntary hospitalization. Then, it discusses 
forces that transformed state hospitals in the last several 
decades, affecting the voluntary-hospitalization context. 
A. The Current Law of Voluntary and Involuntary Admissions 
Patients with acute mental health needs137 can be admitted 
to a psychiatric facility in a variety of ways.138 If the individual 
                                                                                                     
 137.  This Note addresses “civil” mental health patients, as opposed to 
“forensic” patients who are committed to state hospitals through the criminal 
judicial system. Although beyond this Note’s scope, forensic patients represent a 
growing portion of state-hospital populations, and this trend impacts the state-
hospital system generally. Infra notes 181–85 and accompanying text.  
 138. For the provisions of each state’s statute governing inpatient mental 
health treatment, see 22 ALA. CODE ch. 52, art. 1 (2012); 47 ALASKA STAT. ch. 30, 
arts. 8–9 (2012); 36 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 5 (2012); 20 ARK. CODE ANN. ch. 47, 
subch. 2 (2012); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE div. 5 pt. 1, div. 6 pt. 1, ch. 1 (2012); 27 
COLO. REV. STAT. art. 65 (2012); 17A CONN. GEN. STAT. ch. 319I, pt. II (2012); 16 
DEL. CODE ANN. chs. 50–51 (2012); 21 D.C. CODE ch. 5 (2012); XXIX FLA. STAT. 
ch. 394, pt. 1 (2012); 37 GA. CODE ANN. ch. 3, arts. 1–2 (2012); 19 HAW. REV. 
STAT. ch. 334, pts. IV–V (2012); 66 IDAHO CODE ANN. ch. 3 (2012); 405 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. Act 5, ch. 3 (2012); 12 IND. CODE art. 26 (2012); VI IOWA CODE ch. 229 
(2012); 59 KAN. STAT. ANN. Art. 29 (2012); XVII KY. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 202A 
(2012); 28 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 1, part III (2012); 34-B ME. REV. STAT. ch. 3, 
subch. 4 (2012); 10 MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. subtits. 6–8 (2012); XVII 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123 (2012); 330 MICH. COMP. LAWS ch. 4 (2012); MINN. 
STAT. ch. 253B (2012); 41 MISS. CODE ANN. ch. 21 (2012); XL MO. REV. STAT. ch. 
632 (2012); 53 MONT. CODE ANN. ch. 21 (2012); 71 NEB. REV. STAT. art. 9 (2012); 
39 NEV. REV. STAT. ch. 433A (2012); X N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 135-C (2012); 30 
N.J. STAT. ANN. subtit. 1, ch. 4, art. 3 (2012); N.M. STAT. ANN. ch. 43, art. 1 
(2012); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW ch. 27, tit. B, art. 9 (2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 
122C, art. 5 (2012); 25 N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 25-03.1 (2012); LI OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. ch. 5122 (2012); 43a OKLA. STAT. ch. 1, § 5 (2012); 35 OR. REV. STAT. ch. 426 
(2012); 50 PA. CONS. STAT. ch. 15 (2012); 40.1 R.I. GEN. LAWS ch. 5 (2012); 44 S.C. 
CODE ANN. ch. 17 (2012); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ch. 27a (2012); 33 TENN. CODE 
ANN. ch. 6 (2012); 7 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. subtit. C (2012); 62a 
UTAH CODE ANN. ch. 15, pt. 6 (2012); 18 VT. STAT. ANN. pt. 8 (2012); 37.2 VA. 
CODE ANN. subtit. III (2012); WASH. REV. CODE ch. 71.05 (2012); W.V. CODE ch. 
27, arts. 1, 4–5 (2012); WIS. STAT. ch. 51 (2012); 25 WYO. STAT. ANN. ch. 10, art. 1 
(2012). 
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agrees to the admission and gives informed consent, then he 
may be admitted voluntarily.139  
Voluntary patients can be further subdivided into two 
categories: pure voluntary or conditional voluntary. Under a 
“pure” or “informal” voluntary admission, a patient can leave 
the hospital whenever he chooses.140 This freedom to walk out of 
the hospital may compromise therapeutic interventions, and so 
states often restrict pure voluntary admissions either by law or 
by policy and favor “conditional” or “formal” voluntary 
admissions.141 Typically, a formally voluntary patient who 
requests to leave the facility may be detained for a statutorily 
defined period—usually a few days—during which time the 
clinical staff evaluates whether the patient requires involuntary 
commitment.142 Based on this evaluation, clinical staff may 
institute involuntary commitment proceedings if warranted, and 
otherwise must discharge the patient once the statutory holding 
period elapses.143  
                                                                                                     
 139. See APPELBAUM & GUTHEIL, supra note 46, at 43 (noting that all states 
currently allow voluntary admission). 
 140. Id. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 330.1412 (2012) (“An informal 
voluntary patient shall be allowed to terminate his hospitalization and leave the 
hospital at any time during the normal day shift hours of the hospital, and the 
hospital shall so inform the patient at the time he is hospitalized.”). 
 141. APPELBAUM & GUTHEIL, supra note 46, at 43. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. 
LAWS § 330.1411 (restricting informal voluntary hospitalizations by requiring 
that “the hospital director consider[] the individual to be clinically suitable for 
that form of hospitalization”). 
 142. APPELBAUM & GUTHEIL, supra note 46, at 43. For examples of state 
statutes allowing voluntary patients to be prevented from leaving the state 
hospital at will for a specific period of time, see ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.685 (2012) 
(48-hour hold); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-519(B) (2012) (24-hour hold, excluding 
weekends and holidays); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-506(a) (2012) (3-day hold); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5123(d) (2012) (5-day hold); FLA. STAT. § 394.4625(2)(a)(2) 
(2012) (3-day hold, excluding holidays and weekends); GA. CODE ANN. § 37-3-
22(a) (2012) (72-hour hold, excluding Sundays and legal holidays); 405 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 5/3-403 (2012) (5-day hold, excluding weekends and holidays); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 330.1452 (2012) (7-day hold, excluding weekends and 
holidays); 50 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4403(c) (2012) (10-day hold); WYO. STAT. ANN. 
§ 25-10-108 (2012) (24-hour hold). 
 143. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-519(B); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-506(a); 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5123(d)(3); FLA. STAT. § 394.4625(2)(a); 405 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 5/3-403; 50 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4403(c). 
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The term “voluntary” is misleading. These admissions often 
involve coercive factors like criminal charges or family 
pressures.144 Additionally, not only do the locked doors mean that 
voluntary patients are physically restricted from walking out of 
the facility, but most voluntary patients are legally restricted 
from leaving the hospital at will.145 
Alternatively, involuntary civil commitment procedures are 
available to hospitalize individuals who either refuse to consent 
to treatment or who lack capacity to consent.146 Some baseline 
constitutional standards limit state laws.147 States cannot 
involuntarily confine an individual simply because he has a 
mental illness: commitment requires that a mental illness is 
causing a person to pose some danger to himself or to others.148 
Civil commitment also demands that a state prove, by clear and 
convincing evidence, that commitment is appropriate under state 
law.149  
Within these constitutional constraints, states enact varying 
laws. Most states permit emergency commitment based on a 
clinical psychiatric evaluation of statutory criteria, allowing for 
short-term, temporary hospitalization until a judicial hearing can 
be convened.150 Commitment hearings are formal proceedings 
                                                                                                     
 144. See RAYMOND L. SPRING ET AL., PATIENTS, PSYCHIATRISTS & LAWYERS: 
LAW & THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 374 (2d ed. 1997) (“A high percentage of 
‘voluntary’ patients are in the hospital only because of external coercion of some 
form.”); Janet A. Gilboy & John R. Schmidt, “Voluntary” Hospitalization of the 
Mentally Ill, 66 NW. U. L. REV. 429, 430 (1971) (arguing that voluntary 
hospitalization usually involves some degree of coercion). 
 145. APPELBAUM & GUTHEIL, supra note 46, at 39. See also supra note 142 
(collecting state statutes permitting state hospitals to hold voluntary patients 
for evaluation after the patient requests to be discharged).  
 146. See APPELBAUM & GUTHEIL, supra note 46, at 40–42 (discussing the 
history of, and rationales for, civil commitment). 
 147. See id. at 42–45 (reviewing the standards governing civil commitment).  
 148. See O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975) (“[A] State cannot 
constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous individual who is capable 
of surviving safely in freedom.”).  
 149. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431 (1979) (ruling that due 
process demands clear and convincing evidence because this standard “strikes a 
fair balance between the rights of the individual and the legitimate concerns of 
the state”).  
 150. See APPELBAUM & GUTHEIL, supra note 46, at 42–43 (explaining that 
emergency commitments vary in length from two days to three weeks and 
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where judicial officers preside and patients are afforded some due 
process rights.151 State laws on involuntary commitment 
standards require different levels of “dangerousness” caused by a 
mental illness. Substantively, these laws generally encompass 
three elements: (1) the individual has a mental illness; (2) the 
individual is dangerous; and (3) the individual needs 
treatment.152 Some states are increasing commitment standards 
                                                                                                     
providing information on different clinical and evidentiary requirements under 
state law to institute emergency commitment). See, e.g., ARIZ. STAT. ANN. § 36-
535(B) (2012) (6 business days); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-502(a) (2012) (15 days); 
GA. CODE ANN. § 37-3-62 (2012) (15 days); 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-706 (2012) (5 
days). 
 151. See APPELBAUM & GUTHEIL, supra note 46, at 43 (explaining that in the 
vast majority of states, judges—rather than administrative officers or juries—
decide civil commitment hearings). See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-505 
(2012) (guaranteeing patients an independent evaluation of their condition); 
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5256.4 (2012) (guaranteeing patients counsel, the 
right to present evidence, and the right to cross-examination); GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 37-3-1(8) (2012) (requiring that patients have “effective assistance of counsel,” 
that hearings be recorded, and giving patients subpoena power, among other 
procedural rights); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 10-631 (2012) (requiring 
that involuntarily admitted patients receive notice in plain language informing 
them of their rights to consult counsel, and requiring that if the patient cannot 
understand the notice contents, his parent, guardian, or next-of-kin receive the 
information). 
 152. See APPELBAUM & GUTHEIL, supra note 46, at 43–45 (reviewing the 
differences among state civil commitment laws). For specific examples of state 
statutes setting forth the requirements for involuntary civil commitment, see 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 §§ 5001, 5010 (2012) (requiring that mental illness 
“renders [a] person unable to make responsible decisions with respect to the 
person’s hospitalization” and that the person pose “a real and present threat” of 
harm without immediate hospitalization); FLA. STAT. § 394.4667(1) (2012) 
(requiring serious mental illness and either that the person pose a harm to 
himself or others, or that he is unable to function in the community); HAW. REV. 
STAT. § 334-60.2 (2012) (requiring that the person “is imminently dangerous to 
self or others, is gravely disabled or is obviously ill”); KY. STAT. § 202A.026 
(2012) (requiring that the person present either a danger or threat of danger to 
self or others, and can reasonably benefit from treatment); MD. CODE ANN., 
HEALTH–GEN. § 10-632(g) (2012) (requiring a “mental disorder,” which requires 
inpatient care, and that the person “present[] a danger to the life or safety of the 
individual or of others”); MICH. COMP. LAW § 330-1401 (2012) (defining “person 
requiring treatment” to include an individual who, because of mental illness, 
cannot attend to his basic needs, or who cannot understand his need for 
treatment, is treatment noncompliant, and has consequently been violent or 
been placed in psychiatric facilities, prison, or jail twice in past forty-eight 
months). 
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by demanding proof of some threat, attempt, or actual occurrence 
of harm.153 
States continue to develop laws governing civil commitment. 
For example, most states have adopted “outpatient commitment” 
laws, which require certain patients to comply with psychiatric 
treatment in the community.154 As states rework the laws 
governing commitment, the context of voluntary hospitalization 
evolves.155 
B. The Historical Context of Mental Health Law and 
Hospitalization 
Mental health law and public hospitalization should be 
understood in historical context.156 Sovereigns have confined 
mentally ill persons for centuries.157 At common law, the 
                                                                                                     
 153. See APPELBAUM & GUTHEIL, supra note 46, at 43 (explaining that 
heightened proof standards are intended to make the commitment 
determination an objective decision).  
 154. See id. at 48 (discussing outpatient commitment laws). Only a few 
states use these laws regularly because most states lack needed clinical and 
administrative structures at this time. Id. The criteria for which individuals 
qualify for outpatient commitment vary; some states require a high likelihood 
that a patient will relapse into acute symptoms, while other states require a 
pattern of dangerousness. Id. For examples of state statutes governing 
outpatient commitment orders and standards, see ALA. CODE §§ 22-52-10.2 
to -10.3 (2012); FLA. STAT. § 394.4655 (2012); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 37-3-90, 37-3-93 
(2012) (permitting courts to order outpatient commitment for one-year periods if 
a physician concludes from examination that an individual “is a mentally ill 
person requiring involuntary treatment” and outpatient treatment is available); 
50 PA. CON. STAT. § 4406(b) (2012) (“[A] court may permit partial hospitalization 
or outpatient care, or if at any time thereafter the director shall determine such 
partial hospitalization or outpatient care to be beneficial to the person so 
committed, the same may be permitted by said court upon application by the 
director.”). 
 155. See JOHN Q. LAFOND & MARY L. DURHAM, BACK TO THE ASYLUM: THE 
FUTURE OF MENTAL HEALTH LAW & POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 53–56 (1992) 
(reviewing different proposals for modifying civil commitment law).  
 156. See PAUL S. APPELBAUM, ALMOST A REVOLUTION: MENTAL HEALTH LAW & 
THE LIMITS OF CHANGE 12–13 (1994) (arguing that examining the evolution of 
mental health laws in recent decades “strengthen[s] our understanding of the 
complex interaction of forces involved when the law is applied to the mentally 
ill”).  
 157. See Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Theories and 
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government was obligated to “take care of those who could not 
take care of themselves.”158 American courts continued applying 
this rule, but legal procedures changed as psychiatry evolved.159 
In the twentieth century, mental health law and public 
psychiatric facilities transformed dramatically with regards to 
both the voluntary nature and the total number of admissions.  
First, in the twentieth century voluntary admission became 
available and popular.160 During the first half of the century, 
almost every psychiatric patient was admitted involuntarily.161 
Involuntary admissions were preferred for administrative 
convenience and a general belief that “the presence of mental 
illness per se rendered a person incompetent to consent to 
hospitalization.”162 State hospitals were considered important 
institutions for social reform, with psychiatric professionals 
bestowed significant power over their patients.163  
Beginning in the 1950s, psychiatric professionals and 
patients’-rights advocates fought to increase voluntary 
treatment.164 States responded, dramatically revising the laws 
governing admissions.165 By the early 1970s, voluntary 
admissions became more common than involuntary admissions. 
Currently, most patients are admitted voluntarily when both 
                                                                                                     
Procedures, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1288, 1288 (1966) [hereinafter Commitment 
Theories & Procedures] (discussing involuntary commitment at common law).  
 158. See, e.g., Beverly’s Case, (1603) 76 Eng. Rep. 1118 (K.B.) 1124–26; 4 Co. 
Rep. 123 b, 126 a–127 b (discussing the King’s duties to “lunatics” and “idiots”). 
 159. See Commitment Theories & Procedures, supra note 157, at 1288 
(explaining that “lunatics” came to be seen as ill, rather than as cursed). 
 160. See APPELBAUM & GUTHEIL, supra note 46, at 38 (“[T]he idea that the 
mentally ill might be able to sign themselves into psychiatric hospitals 
voluntarily is a relatively new one.”). 
 161. See id. (“[B]y 1949 only 10% of patients were voluntarily admitted [to 
psychiatric hospitals].”). No state permitted voluntarily admission until 1881. 
Id.  
 162. Id.  
 163. See LAFOND & DURHAM, supra note 155, at 84 (stating that before civil 
rights reforms, state actors could “make virtually all decisions for patients”).  
 164. See id. (explaining that civil libertarians opposed involuntary 
confinement, while psychiatrists favored voluntary admissions because they led 
to more effective treatment). 
 165. Id.  
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private and public/state hospitals are considered.166 Some states 
even adopted statutory presumptions or policy statements 
encouraging voluntary—rather than involuntary—admission and 
treatment.167 In state hospitals, however, involuntary admissions 
have recently become more common than voluntary.168  
Second, in the late-twentieth century the number of state 
hospital beds—and subsequently, the number of state-hospital 
patients—declined dramatically. In the mid-1950s, over 500,000 
mentally ill persons sat “warehoused” in state institutions for 
years without effective treatment and lacking a mechanism to 
obtain release.169 By 2003, the number of state hospital beds had 
fallen by over 90%, down to 40,000 beds.170  
Deinstitutionalization grew from a combination of factors: 
changing societal attitudes about institutionalization; financial 
incentives to treat people in the community; new antipsychotic 
medications, allowing outpatient treatment; new federal 
                                                                                                     
 166. Id.  
 167.  See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.655(1) (2012) (“Persons [should] be given 
every reasonable opportunity to accept voluntary treatment before involvement 
with the judicial system.”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 27-65-101(d) (2012) (declaring 
that the legislature intends to “encourage the use of voluntary rather than 
coercive measures to provide treatment and care”).  
 168. See LAFOND & DURHAM, supra note 155, at 43 (noting the trend); see 
also infra notes 183–84 and accompanying text (explaining the relationship 
between deinstitutionalization and involuntary admissions, as well as the effect 
on the patient populations in state hospitals). 
 169. See LAFOND & DURHAM, supra note 155, at 85 (describing “inhumane 
conditions in mental hospitals” in the 1940s).  
 170. See Ronald W. Manderscheld, Joanne E. Atay & Raquel A. Crider, 
Changing Trends in State Hospital Use from 2002–2005, 60 PSYCHIATRIC 
SERVICES 1, 1 (2009) (discussing trends in state hospitals). In 2011, only 145,065 
total adults received inpatient treatment in state hospitals—a number higher 
than the number of beds because it accounts for patients who were discharged 
and whose beds were filled by a subsequent admission. See SUBSTANCE ABUSE & 
MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., ALABAMA 2011 MENTAL HEALTH NATIONAL 
OUTCOME MEASURES (NOMS): CMHS UNIFORM REPORTING SYSTEM 9 (2011), 
http://www.samhsa.gov/dataoutcomes/urs/2011/Alabama.pdf (listing the total 
number of adults treated in state psychiatric hospitals throughout the United 
States in 2011). For data on each state in 2011, see 2011 CMHS Uniform 
Reporting System Output Tables, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. 
ADMIN., http://www.samhsa.gov/dataoutcomes/urs/urs2011.aspx (last visited 
Feb. 3, 2013) (linking to each state’s uniform data for 2011, and comparing state 
data to national data) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
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legislation aimed at building outpatient treatment centers; and 
civil liberties lawyers’ advocacy.171 The civil liberties lawyers 
facilitated deinstitutionalization through several key lawsuits 
challenging hospital conditions and commitment procedures.172 
These suits facially addressed civil rights violations in state 
hospitals, but were actually “targeted at closing down the 
hospitals.”173  
Deinstitutionalization caused “staggering” effects on the 
mentally ill population and mental health services.174 Although a 
full understanding of deinstitutionalization is beyond the scope of 
this Note, one important effect is relevant: The availability of 
state psychiatric hospitalization declined dramatically.175 States 
have slashed the number of state hospital beds.176 Because beds 
are scarce, states limit admission to patients with the severest 
symptoms.177 The structure of healthcare funding for psychiatric 
                                                                                                     
 171. See Jeffrey L. Geller, The Last Half-Century of Psychiatric Services as 
Reflected in PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES, 51 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 41, 42–58 (2000) 
(providing a comprehensive overview of factors causing deinstitutionalization); 
see also Community Mental Health Centers Act, Pub. L. No. 88-164, tit. II, 77 
Stat. 282, 290–94 (1963) (allocating federal funding to states that established 
agencies for administering outpatient mental health care). 
 172. See O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975) (ruling that civil 
commitment requires the patient be dangerous and unable to live safely in the 
community); Wyatt v. Alderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1313–14 (5th Cir. 1974) 
(upholding injunction ordering Alabama state hospitals to improve the condition 
and staffing ratios). 
 173. See E. FULLER TORREY, THE INSANITY OFFENSE: HOW AMERICA’S FAILURE 
TO TREAT THE SERIOUSLY MENTALLY ILL ENDANGERS ITS CITIZENS 4 (2008) (noting 
that many states responded to Wyatt and O’Connor by discharging patients).  
 174. Id. at 50.  
 175. See SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., FUNDING & 
CHARACTERISTICS OF STATE MENTAL HEALTH AGENCIES 69 (2009) [hereinafter 
SAMHSA FUNDING REPORT] (discussing the trend in most states to decrease 
state hospital services). 
 176. Id. One effect of deinstitutionalization is that many people with severe 
mental illness are now institutionalized in prisons and jails rather than 
hospitals. See GRANT H. MORRIS, REFUSING THE RIGHT TO REFUSE: COERCED 
TREATMENT OF MENTALLY DISORDERED PERSONS 150–51 (2006) (stating that 
approximately 283,000 people with mental illness were incarcerated in a 1998 
study—often for petty crimes—meaning that jails have become the largest 
mental health providers in the country).  
 177. See LAFOND & DURHAM, supra note 155, at 51–52 (describing how 
deinstitutionalization and the consequent shortage of state hospital services 
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services encourages this practice by covering a predetermined 
amount of care in private facilities.178 State governments bear the 
entire cost of patients’ treatment in state hospitals, incentivizing 
states not to admit patients with available insurance coverage 
into the state-funded public facilities.179 As a result, the sickest 
individuals—those who run out of covered inpatient services—are 
more likely to be admitted to state hospitals.180  
The legal system also caused changes in state hospitals. State 
hospitals are also devoting more beds to forensic patients who 
come from the criminal system.181 In 2008, one-third of state-
hospital patients had been criminally committed to the hospital.182 
State psychiatric hospitals also recently witnessed a dramatic rise 
in the proportion of involuntarily committed patients, a trend that 
contrasts with the general rise of voluntary admissions noted 
above.183 The trend back to involuntary commitment in state 
hospitals stems from increasing forensic populations and general 
goals underlying deinstitutionalization.184 The proportional rise of 
involuntary patients indicates a corollary rise in the proportion of 
patients posing a risk of harm—a necessary precondition to 
involuntary commitment. State hospitals, then, face more violent 
patient populations.185 
The state hospital today differs sharply from the state 
hospital in previous decades.186 The sweeping reforms, sharp 
                                                                                                     
caused a heightened threshold for determining which individuals are admitted 
to state institutions).  
 178. See John Petrila, Ethics, Money, and the Problem of Coercion: Coercion 
in Managed Behavioral Health Care, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 359, 370–71 (1996) 
(discussing the impact of mental health coverage on public hospitals). 
 179. Id.  
 180. Id.  
 181. See SAMHSA FUNDING REPORT, supra note 175, at 71 (stating that 
between 1993 and 2007, state hospital expenditures for forensic services 
increased from 10.7% to 36%). 
 182. Id.  
 183. See LAFOND & DURHAM, supra note 155, at 43 (suggesting a trend 
toward involuntary admissions in state hospitals). 
 184. Id. (explaining that in some states, public hospitals serve only 
involuntary patients in order to keep the patient census low).  
 185. Id. at 53.  
 186. See William H. Fisher, Jeffrey L. Geller & John A. Pandiani, The 
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budget cuts, and concentration of more violent and more acutely 
ill patients suggest that courts should carefully guard patients’ 
rights. But voluntary patients’ rights are murky, with circuits 
divided on how to properly analyze affirmative duties.187 
IV. Circuit Split over Affirmative Duties to Voluntary Patients 
This distinction between patients admitted voluntarily 
versus involuntarily bears significance beyond just criteria for 
admission or discharge. Courts use this voluntary/involuntary 
distinction to determine whether the state owes a particular 
patient Youngberg rights, but the circuits disagree on how to 
properly analyze voluntary patients’ rights.188 This circuit split 
predates DeShaney, but since DeShaney was handed down, that 
decision drives the train in courts’ analyses.189 This Part 
examines two broad approaches that circuit courts take. First, 
several circuits look solely to a patient’s formal status as a 
voluntary or involuntary patient.190 Second, other circuits 
scrutinize the facts in each case, looking at the circumstances of a 
patient’s hospitalization to determine whether the patient’s 
commitment was voluntary or involuntary.191  
                                                                                                     
Changing Role of the State Psychiatric Hospital, 28 HEALTH AFFAIRS 676, 676–81 
(arguing that state hospitals evolved from being the primary treatment source 
for the mentally ill, and now primarily manage those people who cannot be 
managed elsewhere). The authors identify four groups of patients whom they 
predict will likely “define the state hospital’s mission for the foreseeable future”: 
(1) people with criminal justice histories; (2) forensic patients; (3) sexually 
dangerous persons; and (4) patients who are difficult to discharge, often because 
of the severity of their illness. Id. at 679–80. 
 187. See infra Part IV (discussing the circuit split). 
 188. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (stating Youngberg’s rule that 
involuntarily committed mental health patients are owed certain affirmative 
duties); Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d 673, 682 n.1 (6th Cir. 2008) (noting the 
circuit split on whether states owe affirmative duties to voluntary patients). 
 189. See Lanman, 529 F.3d at 682 n.1 (discussing the circuit split both 
before and after DeShaney). 
 190. See infra Part IV.A (reviewing cases applying status-based tests).  
 191. See infra Part IV.B (reviewing cases applying fact-based tests).  
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A. A Status-Based Approach to Affirmative Duties 
One group of circuit courts applies the general no-duty rule 
broadly when voluntary patients bring Youngberg-type claims 
premised on affirmative duties of care or protection.192 Basing 
their affirmative-duty analysis on the patients’ formal admission 
status, these circuits interpret DeShaney to preclude affirmative 
duties for everyone except civilly committed patients.193 
1. Sixth Circuit: Higgs v. Latham194 
The Sixth Circuit applied a status-based analysis focused on 
the voluntary/involuntary distinction in Higgs v. Latham.195 
Josephine Higgs was admitted to Western State Hospital in 
complicated circumstances. Josephine was initially a patient at 
Grayson County Hospital.196 Her husband observed her mental 
illness worsening during her treatment at Grayson, he petitioned 
a court to order Josephine to be involuntarily hospitalized at 
Western State, and the court granted this order.197 Pursuant to 
this order, Josephine was transported via ambulance from 
Grayson to Western State, and was strapped down due to state 
officials’ concern that she would harm herself.198 Upon arriving at 
Western State, however, Josephine was allowed to sign herself in 
as a voluntary patient because the Western State staff were 
                                                                                                     
 192. See infra notes 222–57 and accompanying text (discussing cases 
highlighting the status-based analysis applied in the Sixth, First, and Fifth 
Circuits).  
 193. See infra notes 207, 234, 236, and 257 and accompanying text 
(discussing these circuits’ interpretations of DeShaney as limiting affirmative 
duties to formally committed patients). 
 194. Higgs v. Latham, No. 91-5273, 1991 WL 216464, at *4 (6th Cir. Oct. 24, 
1991) (per curiam) (affirming the district court’s ruling that the state owed no 
affirmative duties to a patient who was sent to a hospital under judicial order, 
but admitted voluntarily due to a communication error in the emergency room). 
 195. Id.  
 196. Id. at *1, *5. The opinion provides scant information about the Grayson 
hospitalization; it is unclear whether Josephine was voluntarily admitted or 
whether this hospitalization was for psychiatric or medical treatment.  
 197. Id.  
 198. Id.  
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never informed about the prior court proceeding.199 Had the 
hospital known about the court order, it would not have allowed 
Josephine to sign in as a voluntary patient.200 After Josephine 
was admitted, another patient sexually assaulted her, prompting 
Josephine and her husband to bring this § 1983 suit for monetary 
and injunctive relief.201 The case first went before a magistrate 
judge, who denied the State’s motion for summary judgment, 
finding a genuine factual dispute over whether Josephine was, in 
fact, a voluntary patient.202 The district court reversed, granting 
summary judgment to the State on the grounds that Josephine 
was a voluntary patient with no constitutional right to 
affirmative care and protection.203 
The Sixth Circuit agreed that Josephine, as a voluntary 
patient, had no positive rights.204 The court began by analyzing 
Youngberg and DeShaney.205 The court interpreted Youngberg as 
concluding that involuntary patients have affirmative rights, but 
as silent regarding voluntary patients.206 DeShaney, however, 
does apply to voluntary patients, and under DeShaney, 
affirmative duties depend “on the kind of restraint that disables a 
person from caring for himself.”207 Applied to this case, the court 
reasoned that the state’s court order did not amount to an actual 
restraint because it was “unexecuted and unknown” to the 
hospital.208 For the hospital to take on affirmative duties, the 
hospital must have restrained Josephine.209 And because the 
                                                                                                     
 199. Id. at *1–2.  
 200. See id. at *1 (containing the testimony about the admission 
procedures).  
 201. Id.  
 202. Id. at *2. 
 203. Id. 
 204. See id. at *4 (“If the district court was correct in concluding that Mrs. 
Higgs was a voluntary patient at Western State Hospital, then it follows that 
she had no constitutionally based right of action against any of the 
defendants.”).  
 205. See id. at *2–4 (examining these cases).  
 206. Id. at *2.  
 207. Id. at *3.  
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. at *4.  
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hospital did not know about the court order and because 
Josephine signed voluntary admission papers, “there was no 
‘affirmative act’ by the hospital to deprive her of liberty,” and so 
the state’s duty-to-protect was never triggered.210 
The majority rejected Josephine’s arguments that she was 
not competent to be voluntarily admitted and that hospital staff 
coerced her into signing the voluntary paperwork.211 First, 
regarding Josephine’s “allegedly confused state of mind,” the 
court refused to engage in this “highly problematic exploration of 
the state of mind of an acutely ill mental patient.”212 Second, the 
court rejected arguments that “advice” given by a nurse at 
Grayson that “it would be better for [Josephine] to admit herself 
voluntarily to Western State rather than being involuntarily 
committed there” amounted to constructive confinement.213  
Judge Suhrheinrich concurred in the ruling but disagreed 
with the majority’s analysis of the voluntary/involuntary 
distinction,214 arguing that the majority misinterpreted 
DeShaney.215 To start, Judge Suhrheinrich contended that 
“DeShaney [does not] control the outcome of this case.”216 First, 
DeShaney does not preclude voluntary patients from establishing 
claims based on functional custody or on state-created danger.217 
With respect to functional custody, Judge Suhrheinrich suggested 
that affirmative duties may have been triggered on the several 
occasions when Josephine requested to leave Western State, “and 
permission was refused.”218 With respect to state-created danger, 
affirmative duties may have been triggered when she was court-
ordered for temporary commitment, given that Josephine 
probably would not have gone to Western State or signed 
                                                                                                     
 210. Id. 
 211. See id. at *4–5 (discussing Josephine’s claims that her admission was 
not voluntary). 
 212. Id. at *5. 
 213. Id.  
 214. Id. at *6 (Suhrheinrich, J., concurring).  
 215. Id.  
 216. Id. 
 217. See id. (“DeShaney’s custody test for liability may therefore be met even 
after it is shown that a patient was voluntarily admitted.”).  
 218. Id. at *6 n.1. 
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voluntary admission papers otherwise.219 Overall, the concurrence 
is noteworthy for its recommendation that voluntary patients 
should be able to make out affirmative-duty claims based on 
functional custody or state-created danger.220 
2. First Circuit: Monahan v. Dorchester Counseling Center221 
The First Circuit adopted a restrictive approach similar to the 
Higgs majority in Monahan v. Dorchester Counseling Center.222 Mr. 
Monahan was a voluntary patient at a state-operated group home 
called Millie’s Cottage.223 On the day the injury occurred, Mr. 
Monahan, accompanied by Cottage staff, went to a hospital 
emergency room and was evaluated for possible admission.224 The 
hospital staff determined that inpatient treatment was unnecessary 
and that he could return to the Cottage.225 While state employees 
were driving him back from the emergency room, Mr. Monahan 
jumped out of the car and walked toward an interstate highway.226 
The driver, a state employee, did not call the police or try to stop Mr. 
Monahan; instead, he drove back to the group home and called a 
hospital, sending two other state employees to look for Mr. 
Monahan.227 During this time, a car struck Mr. Monahan, 
causing serious injury.228 Mr. Monahan then sued state officials 
for injunctive and compensatory relief stemming from his 
injuries, claiming they violated a duty to provide adequate 
                                                                                                     
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. at *6 (“DeShaney compels us to go beyond asking whether Higgs 
was a voluntary admittee. DeShaney demands that we examine the limitations 
imposed on Higgs while she was a resident at the state hospital.”). 
 221. Monahan v. Dorchester Counseling Ctr., 961 F.2d 987, 991 (1st Cir. 
1992) (ruling that a voluntary patient had no constitutional right to protection 
because the state did not restrict his liberties through civil commitment 
procedures).  
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. at 988.  
 224. Id. 
 225. Id.  
 226. Id. at 988–89. 
 227. Id. at 989.  
 228. Id.  
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supervision and treatment.229 The district court granted the 
defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and also 
denied Mr. Monahan’s motion to submit an amended 
complaint.230 Mr. Monahan appealed to the First Circuit.231 
In analyzing whether the state had violated any duty to Mr. 
Monahan, the First Circuit examined the relationship between 
the patient and the state. The facts differ from Youngberg 
because Mr. Monahan was not involuntarily committed.232 The 
facts also differ from DeShaney because Mr. Monahan was living 
in a state-operated facility, rather than a private home.233 Despite 
these differences from DeShaney’s facts, the court applied 
DeShaney’s rationale—that the Due Process Clause does not 
generally impose affirmative duties—and determined that the 
state had assumed no such duty.234 “Because the state did not 
commit Monahan involuntarily, it did not take an ‘affirmative act’ 
of restraining his liberty.”235  
The court rejected Mr. Monahan’s arguments that 
DeShaney’s exceptions for functional custody or state-created 
danger applied, basing its rejection on Mr. Monahan’s voluntary 
status. First, while acknowledging that a state assumes 
affirmative duties when it uses coercive measures to restrict an 
individual’s liberty,236 the court determined that the state had not 
coerced Mr. Monahan because it had not initiated formal 
commitment proceedings.237 The court must look to whether the 
state’s affirmative actions caused Mr. Monahan to give up some 
liberties.238 Mr. Monahan’s mental illness—not the state—
                                                                                                     
 229. Id.  
 230. See id. at 990 (discussing the history in the lower court). 
 231. Id. 
 232. See id. (comparing the instant case to Youngberg).  
 233. See id. (“His relationship to the state was therefore considerably closer 
than that of the plaintiff in DeShaney.”).  
 234. See id. at 990–91 (stating that under DeShaney, Mr. Monahan “failed to 
state a viable claim for denial of substantive due process”).  
 235. Id. at 991.  
 236. See id. at 992 n.5 (interpreting DeShaney’s language to mean that 
“where the state’s coercive power is not involved, there can be no constitutional 
(as opposed to tort) right to careful treatment”).  
 237. Id. at 992.  
 238. Id. Although the circuit had ruled in pre-DeShaney cases that 
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deprived him of his liberty.239 Second, the state-created danger 
argument failed for similar reasons. The state’s actions might 
have made Mr. Monahan more vulnerable to harm.240 Again, Mr. 
Monahan “voluntarily availed himself of a Commonwealth 
service,” and so the state did not take on affirmative duties.241 
Overall, then, the circuit’s analysis turned primarily on Mr. 
Monahan’s voluntary status—the state owed him no affirmative 
duties because the state had not initiated formal commitment 
proceedings.  
3. Fifth Circuit: Walton v. Alexander242 
The Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, adopted a similar analysis 
in Walton v. Alexander.243 Christopher Walton was a voluntary 
residential student at the Mississippi School for the Deaf.244 
Another student sexually assaulted Christopher several times.245 
The state became aware of the first assault and instituted 
precautions, such as separating the students into different 
dormitories.246 But then budgetary constraints caused the school 
to close one of the dormitories and the boys were placed back in 
the same building, where the student sexually assaulted 
Christopher again.247 The district court denied the defendant’s 
                                                                                                     
voluntary patients might have affirmative constitutional rights because of 
severe symptoms or de facto involuntary conditions, the court suggested that 
DeShaney demands different analysis. Id.  
 239. See id. (“His helplessness was not attributable to the [State taking] him 
into custody involuntarily.”).  
 240. See id. at 993 (agreeing with Mr. Monahan’s argument that “the 
Commonwealth could plausibly be said to have rendered him more vulnerable to 
danger”).  
 241. See id. (“The Commonwealth did not force Monahan, against his will, to 
become dependent on it.”).  
 242. Walton v. Alexander, 44 F.3d 1297, 1306 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc) 
(ruling that a state has no duty to protect persons within its custody unless the 
state has taken affirmative steps to involuntarily confine them). 
 243. Id.  
 244. Id. at 1299.  
 245. Id. at 1299–1300.  
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. at 1300.  
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motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. 
The defendant filed an interlocutory appeal, in which a panel 
majority held that Superintendent Alexander had a special 
relationship with Christopher and, therefore, Christopher was 
entitled to Youngberg rights.248 The Fifth Circuit then took up 
this interlocutory appeal en banc, reversing the panel majority’s 
decision and the district court’s denial of immunity.249 
The panel majority had ruled that Christopher was owed 
affirmative duties because the state had exercised functional 
custody.250 Looking to language in DeShaney suggesting that 
states trigger affirmative duties by restraining someone’s liberty 
in a manner similar to incarceration, the court examined the 
factual setting of Christopher’s relationship to the state.251 Many 
facts indicated “a significant custodial component” in this 
relationship: Christopher lived at the school; the school enforced 
strict rules; Christopher was “not free to leave” the school at will; 
and economically, most families had “no other viable option” for 
educating handicapped children.252 These facts combined to make 
Christopher “dependent on the School for his basic needs and [he] 
lost a substantial measure of his freedom to act.”253 The state, 
therefore, had functional custody and was obligated to provide 
Christopher with a reasonably safe environment.254  
The en banc panel disagreed. Summarizing its analysis, the 
Fifth Circuit explained, “we have followed [DeShaney’s] language 
strictly.”255 If a state has affirmatively exercised its power to take 
custody over an individual against his will, then the state 
assumes affirmative duties.256 But Christopher had “voluntarily 
subjected himself” to the state’s custody and had “the option of 
                                                                                                     
 248. See id. (discussing the prior history).  
 249. Id. at 1299. 
 250. See Walton v. Alexander, 20 F.3d 1350, 1355 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding an 
affirmative duty from functional custody), rev’d en banc, 44 F.3d 1297, 1303 (5th 
Cir. 1995) (en banc). 
 251. See id. (describing the facts that indicate a custodial relationship). 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Walton v. Alexander, 44 F.3d 1297, 1303 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc).  
 256. Id. 
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leaving at will.”257 Therefore, the state had no affirmative duty to 
protect him.258  
Judge Parker concurred specially in an opinion joined by 
three other circuit judges.259 The concurrence disagreed with 
DeShaney’s proper interpretation, asserting that the en banc 
majority read DeShaney “erroneously” to require “a bright line 
rule that represents an extreme constitutional viewpoint.”260 But 
this bright-line rule arbitrarily limits constitutional rights 
without accurately reflecting the facts of any given case.261 
The concurrence argued that the court should apply a factor-
based test assessing the quality and nature of the relationship 
between patient and state.262 Reasoning that this test comports 
with DeShaney, Judge Parker looked to the DeShaney opinion.263 
While DeShaney limited affirmative duties to contexts such as 
involuntary commitment and incarceration, the majority was 
explicit that “other similar restraint[s] of personal liberty” will 
trigger affirmative duties.264 Thus, the concurrence argued, courts 
                                                                                                     
 257. See id. at 1305 (analyzing Christopher’s case in light of DeShaney).  
 258. Id.  
 259. Id. at 1306 (Parker, J., concurring).  
 260. Id.  
 261. See id. at 1309 (stating that the majority’s rule arbitrarily assigns 
constitutional rights, and providing hypothetical illustrations of how the bright-
line test fails to reliably and accurately measure state control). 
 262. See id. at 1309–10 
Instead of asking whether a person was taken into custody 
involuntarily, we should consider several factors to determine 
whether a special relationship exists in a particular case: 1) the 
authority and discretion state actors have to control the environment 
and behavior of the individuals in their custody, 2) the 
responsibilities assumed by the State, 3) the extent to which an 
individual in state custody must rely on the State to provide for his or 
her basic needs, and 4) the degree of control actually exercised by the 
State in a given situation. 
 263. See id. at 1307–08 (analyzing DeShaney’s majority opinion).  
 264. Id. (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 
189, 200 (1989)). The concurrence pointed out the absurdity created by the 
majority’s holding: “[S]tate actors entrusted with the responsibility to care for 
and protect our most vulnerable citizens may do so with constitutional 
impunity,” while incarcerated “criminals are wrapped in the protective cloak of 
the constitution.” Id. at 1310. 
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must analyze the restraints on liberty in order to determine 
whether constitutional duties are at play.265 
The Walton majority, however, like the Monahan and Higgs 
courts, determined that affirmative-duty analysis turns on formal 
status. These courts interpret DeShaney to require involuntary 
commitment procedures before a state takes on affirmative 
duties.266 And, as the Higgs and Walton concurrences point out 
(albeit, critically),267 these courts avoid a fact-heavy analysis. 
Only facts about commitment proceedings are relevant, and the 
patient’s formal status is determinative. 
B. A Fact-Based Approach to Affirmative Duties 
Other circuit courts reject a strict status-based approach, 
concluding that voluntary status does not per se preclude 
Youngberg rights. Prior to DeShaney, several circuit courts ruled 
that voluntary status is irrelevant in these cases.268 After 
DeShaney, the Third, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits continue to 
look beyond formal voluntary/involuntary labels. 
                                                                                                     
 265. Id. at 1310. Applying its test, the concurrence concluded that the state 
exercised sufficient control over Christopher to trigger affirmative duties. Id. 
However, the concurrence determined that the state actors were not liable 
because the plaintiffs failed to prove the state violated its duty by acting with 
deliberate indifference. Id. at 1307. 
 266. See supra notes 207, 235, 256 and accompanying text (discussing how 
the First, Sixth, and Fifth Circuits applied DeShaney to require involuntary 
commitment). 
 267. See supra notes 214–20 and accompanying text (summarizing Judge 
Suhrheinrich’s concurrence in Higgs); supra notes 259–65 and accompanying 
text (summarizing Judge Parker’s concurrence in Walton).  
 268. See, e.g., Soc’y for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 
1239, 1246 (2d Cir. 1984) (ruling that patients’ voluntary status is “irrelevant” 
in determining whether Youngberg rights apply, reasoning that Youngberg’s 
analysis applies equally to voluntary and involuntary patients); Goodman v. 
Parwatikar, 570 F.2d 801, 804 (8th Cir. 1978) (ruling that, although a state 
hospital has no obligation to admit anyone, the state owes affirmative duties to 
those individuals that it does admit); Harper v. Cserr, 544 F.2d 1121, 1124 (1st 
Cir. 1976) (ruling that a voluntary patient may assert a constitutional right to 
affirmative protection by establishing a sufficient level of helplessness). 
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1. Eleventh Circuit: Spivey v. Elliot269 
The Eleventh Circuit ruled in Spivey v. Elliot270 that whether 
a child receiving treatment voluntarily in a state-operated 
residential program has Youngberg rights depends on the level of 
control the state exercises.271 Tremain Spivey was a residential 
student at Georgia’s School of the Deaf, living at the school five 
days per week, with his mother’s consent.272 A thirteen-year-old 
classmate sexually assaulted Tremain on several occasions.273 
Tremain’s mother subsequently withdrew him from the school 
and filed a § 1983 suit against the school, claiming that the school 
violated its duty to provide a safe environment under 
Youngberg.274 The district court granted the defendant’s motion 
for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds.275 
Tremain appealed.276 
The Eleventh Circuit issued two opinions responding to the 
State’s argument that Tremain had no right to its protection 
because he was at the school voluntarily.277 In its first ruling, the 
Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the State, interpreting DeShaney 
to mean that a state owes affirmative duties when it exercises 
sufficient control and dominion over an individual.278 The control 
and dominion requirement might be met whether a patient is 
voluntary or involuntary.279 Regarding Tremain’s voluntary 
status, “[t]he outcome of the case cannot turn on that 
                                                                                                     
 269.  Spivey v. Elliot, 29 F.3d 1522, 1526 (11th Cir. 1994) (ruling that the 
state owed affirmative duties to a voluntary patient under DeShaney’s 
functional custody exception). 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. at 1523. 
 273. Id.  
 274. Id. at 1523–24.  
 275. Id. at 1524. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. at 1526.  
 278. See id. (“The question is not so much how the individual got into state 
custody, but to what extent the State exercises dominion and control over that 
individual.”).  
 279. Id. 
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distinction.”280 The court, however, affirmed the district court’s 
grant of summary judgment to the State on qualified immunity 
grounds.281 
In a later ruling, the court revisited its decision sua sponte, 
backing away from its affirmative duty analysis.282 Pointing out 
that Tremain’s claim failed on qualified immunity, the court 
decided that its affirmative duty analysis was unnecessary and 
should not serve as precedent.283 Therefore, while Spivey’s first 
ruling—that affirmative duties may be found independently of 
the voluntary/involuntary distinction—is not binding, the 
analysis is informative as to how the Eleventh Circuit might rule 
in the absence of qualified immunity issues.284 
2. Eighth Circuit: Kennedy v. Schafer285 and Shelton v. Arkansas 
Department of Human Services286 
The Eighth Circuit applied an analysis similar to the 
Eleventh Circuit’s first Spivey decision in Kennedy v. Schafer.287 
                                                                                                     
 280. Id.  
 281. See id. at 1527 (deciding that the petitioner failed to show that his 
constitutional right was clearly established at the time the harm occurred).  
 282. See Spivey v. Elliot, 41 F.3d 1497, 1498 (11th Cir. 1995) (“Upon 
reconsideration on the suggestion of other members of this Court, we now think 
it enough to decide that there was no clearly established constitutional right 
allegedly violated by the defendants.”).  
 283. See id. at 1499 (“[T]his panel has chosen to withdraw all of its prior 
opinion which relates to whether the complaint alleges a constitutional right.”). 
 284. The Supreme Court has ruled that courts should analyze whether a 
constitutional duty is established before reaching qualified immunity questions. 
See Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991) (discussing the proper structure 
of analysis). 
 285. Kennedy v. Schafer, 71 F.3d 292, 295 (8th Cir. 1995) (remanding case 
in which voluntarily admitted psychiatric patient committed suicide and 
instructing lower court that if based on patient’s condition at time of suicide the 
facility could have lawfully detained her, then state had affirmative duty), cert. 
denied, 518 U.S. 1018 (1996). 
 286. Shelton v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 677 F.3d 837, 839, 842 (8th Cir. 
2012) (affirming that state owed no affirmative duties when voluntarily 
admitted psychiatric patient attempted suicide and, upon finding her alive, 
medical staff did not administer mouth-to-mouth resuscitation, leading to the 
patient’s death). 
 287. Kennedy, 71 F.3d. at 295. 
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The patient in this case was Kathleen Kennedy, a fifteen-year-old 
girl who was admitted voluntarily to Hawthorn Children’s 
Psychiatric Hospital in Missouri.288 The hospital knew Kathleen 
was suicidal and her clinicians ordered suicide precautions, 
requiring that the nursing staff keep Kathleen within their 
eyesight.289 About a week after these precautions began, the 
hospital unit was short-staffed, and the nursing supervisor 
declined to schedule another nurse to work the evening shift.290 
That evening, April 8, 1992, the nursing staff did not keep 
Kathleen within their eyesight.291 After 2:30 PM, staff did not see 
Kathleen for over three hours.292 At 5:10 PM, staff discovered 
that Kathleen had committed suicide.293 Her parents sued the 
State under § 1983, claiming that the hospital violated its duty to 
provide a safe and humane environment.294 The district court 
granted summary judgment to the State on the grounds that it 
did not owe Kathleen affirmative Youngberg duties because of her 
voluntary status, and alternatively on qualified immunity 
grounds.295 Kathleen’s parents appealed.296 
In analyzing whether the state owed Kathleen such a duty, 
the Eighth Circuit focused on the degree of control the state 
exercised over Kathleen.297 Its analysis resembles the Eleventh 
Circuit’s initial approach in Spivey, which found that Georgia’s 
control over Tremain Spivey placed him within DeShaney’s 
functional custody exception.298 The Eighth Circuit, however, 
                                                                                                     
 288. Id. at 293. 
 289. Id.  
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. 
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. at 294.  
 295. Id.  
 296. Id. at 293. 
 297. See id. (agreeing with the Kennedy’s argument that “the amount of 
control the state actors . . . exerted over Kathleen’s life” is relevant to whether 
affirmative duties exist).  
 298. See Spivey v. Elliot, 29 F.3d 1522, 1526 (11th Cir. 1994) (“The question 
is not so much how the individual got into state custody, but to what extent the 
State exercises dominion and control over that individual.”). 
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looked to whether Missouri exercised such control over Kathleen 
that “she had become, in effect, an involuntary patient.”299 
Pointing out that Missouri law restricts patients who pose a 
substantial risk of harming themselves from leaving the 
hospital,300 and that this statutory language appeared on the 
voluntary admission papers Kathleen’s mother had signed, the 
court reasoned that Kathleen might not have enjoyed an absolute 
right to leave the hospital.301 The court remanded the case for a 
factual determination of how much control the state exercised 
over Kathleen.302 
To support its analysis, the court pointed to DeShaney’s 
language that a state owes affirmative duties when it exercises 
functional custody, thereby creating a situation “sufficiently 
analogous” to involuntary hospitalization.303 It applied this 
language, however, not asking whether Kathleen’s situation was 
“analogous” to an involuntary patient’s, but by asking whether 
Kathleen had, in fact, become an involuntary patient.304 Through 
this analytic step, the court explicitly avoided addressing whether 
Youngberg might apply to voluntary patients.305 And while the 
                                                                                                     
 299. Kennedy v. Schafer, 71 F.3d 292, 296 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 
U.S. 1018 (1996). 
 300. Id. at 295–96. The court arrived at this interpretation of Missouri law 
by reading three separate statutory provisions together. First, state statutes 
give the hospital discretion to refuse to discharge a minor psychiatric inpatient 
who is substantially at risk of harming herself, covering patients at risk for 
suicide. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 632.155(2), 632.005(10)(a) (2012). Second, if state 
psychiatric workers become aware that any person—including non-patients—is 
likely to cause serious harm because of a psychiatric illness, then the state actor 
is under a duty to evaluate the person’s condition. Id. § 632.300(1). Third, if the 
state actor concludes that this person poses an “imminent” risk of substantial 
harm because of a psychiatric illness, then the actor is obligated to initiate 
procedures for involuntary hospitalization. Id. § 632.300(2).  
 301. Kennedy, 71 F.3d at 295.  
 302. Id. at 296. 
 303. Id. at 295 (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 
489 U.S. 189, 201 n.9 (1989)).  
 304. See id. (stating that factors such as Kathleen’s clinical condition and 
state law “may have converted her status to that of an involuntary patient”); id. 
at 296 (“Facts change, and legal status follows facts.”).  
 305. Id. at 295 (“[T]his disposition makes it unnecessary to address the 
question whether a voluntary mental patient enjoys the same due process 
protections as an involuntary patient.”).  
SHELTERING PSYCHIATRIC PATIENTS 771 
Kennedy court looked beyond Kathleen’s formal status, it 
nevertheless grounded its decision on her de facto status as either 
a voluntary or an involuntary patient.306  
The Eighth Circuit recently revisited its Kennedy decision in 
Shelton v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, clarifying 
the circuit’s approach to voluntarily admitted patients.307 The 
facts in Shelton resemble those in Kennedy, with several key 
differences.308 Brenda Shelton signed in as a voluntary patient at 
Arkansas State Hospital because she was suicidal.309 The clinical 
staff initially placed her on “suicide watch,” but—unlike Kathleen 
Kennedy—these precautions were eventually removed.310 Three 
days later, nursing staff found Brenda in her room and discovered 
that Brenda had hanged herself.311 Brenda was unconscious, but 
still alive.312 The clinical staff, however, refused to provide 
mouth-to-mouth resuscitation.313 Medical equipment that might 
have helped revive Brenda was locked in a storage room; the 
room was unavailable because a nurse had locked the key inside 
the room.314 Brenda died a few days later.315 The administrator of 
her estate sued the State, the hospital, and several clinicians 
individually, alleging, inter alia, that the hospital violated 
Brenda’s substantive due process rights.316 The district court 
dismissed the lawsuit for failing to state a claim, ruling that the 
state did not owe Brenda affirmative duties because she was a 
voluntary patient.317  
                                                                                                     
 306. See id. at 296 (stating that Kathleen’s formal status is not 
determinative, and that the lower court must resolve whether Kathleen was, in 
effect, involuntary).  
 307. Shelton v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 677 F.3d 837 (8th Cir. 2012).  
 308. Compare id. at 839 (explaining the facts in Shelton), with supra notes 
288–94 and accompanying text (explaining the facts in Kennedy).  
 309. Shelton, 677 F.3d at 839. 
 310. Id. 
 311. Id. 
 312. Id. 
 313. Id. 
 314. Id. 
 315. Id. 
 316. Id. 
 317. Id. at 839–40. 
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On appeal to the Eighth Circuit, the arguments concentrated 
on Kennedy’s proper application.318 Brenda’s estate argued that, 
under Kennedy, affirmative duties were triggered when the 
hospital staff discovered that Brenda had hanged herself.319 The 
court pointed out that the estate “appear[ed] to concede” that 
duties were not triggered when the clinical staff removed 
Brenda’s suicide precautions several days before.320 This fact 
differentiated Brenda’s circumstances from Kathleen 
Kennedy’s.321  
The two cases were further distinguished, the court 
explained, by whether the alleged constitutional violation 
occurred before or after the patient attempted suicide.322 The 
nurses failed to sufficiently monitor Kathleen before she 
committed suicide, while the alleged wrong in Brenda’s case 
occurred after the staff found her still alive.323 Brenda was 
“wholly incapacitated” and incapable of further harming 
herself.324 Consequently, any state statutes requiring involuntary 
treatment for persons at risk of self-harm could not have 
converted Brenda’s voluntary admission to involuntary (as was 
the case in Kennedy).325 Moreover, the court expressed reluctance 
to impose potential liability on state actors to emergency 
situations, which require “split-second, emergency-care 
decisionmaking.”326 Characterizing Kennedy as “a very close 
                                                                                                     
 318. See id. at 840–42 (considering competing interpretations of the Kennedy 
decision and its impact on the instant case). 
 319. Id. at 840–41 (describing petitioner’s arguments).  
 320. Id. at 841.  
 321. See id. (explaining that Kennedy involved “at least a degree of” liberty 
deprivation because Kathleen was on suicide precautions, differentiating that 
case from Shelton, in which Brenda was not on suicide precautions when the 
injury occurred). 
 322. Id.  
 323. Id. 
 324. See id. at 842 (stating that, as a factual matter, Brenda posed no risk of 
additional self-harm because she was unconscious).  
 325. See id. (reasoning that Brenda’s situation resembled an unconscious 
patient brought into an emergency room; in such a situation, the state is not 
constitutionally obligated to provide treatment).  
 326. Id. 
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case,” the court declined to extend Kennedy’s rule, although it left 
the rule intact.327  
3. Third Circuit: Torisky v. Schweiker328 
The Third Circuit also applied a fact-intensive analysis in 
Torisky v. Schweiker.329 In this case, the guardians of twenty 
individuals with mental retardation sued Pennsylvania officials 
after the patients were transferred between facilities.330 The 
patients were all being treated at the Western Center, and when 
the state decided to close this facility, it transferred the patients 
to other state facilities.331 The patients then brought § 1983 
claims seeking monetary and injunctive relief.332 The circuit court 
reviewed the district court’s ruling that voluntary patients share 
the same constitutional rights under Youngberg that 
involuntarily committed patients enjoy.333 
To resolve this issue, the court examined DeShaney and 
other circuit rulings. From the case law, the court first concluded 
that not every mental health patient has Youngberg rights.334 
Even though voluntary patients reside in the state’s custody, the 
state may not have deprived them of their liberty.335 The court 
                                                                                                     
 327. Id.  
 328. Torisky v. Schweiker, 446 F.3d 438, 447 (3d Cir. 2006) (concluding that 
whether a voluntary patient possesses due process rights requires “looking 
beyond the label of an individual’s confinement to ascertain whether the state 
has deprived an individual of liberty in such a way as to trigger Youngberg’s 
protections”). 
 329. Id. 
 330. Id. at 441.  
 331. Id.  
 332. Id.  
 333. See id. (defining the issue as “whether a state’s affirmative duty under 
the Due Process Clause to care for and protect a mental health patient in state 
custody depends upon the individual’s custody being involuntary”). 
 334. See id. at 444 (“[T]he substantive rights recognized in Youngberg are 
limited to persons whose personal liberty has been substantially curtailed by the 
state.” (quoting Fialkowski v. Greenwich Home for Children, 921 F.2d 459, 465 
(3d Cir. 1990))). 
 335. See id. at 446 (“Thus, a custodial relationship created merely by an 
individual’s voluntary submission to state custody is not a ‘deprivation of liberty’ 
sufficient to trigger the protections of Youngberg.”). 
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extracted a common theme from other circuits’ rulings: whether a 
state has deprived an individual’s liberty and triggered 
Youngberg’s protections depends on “whether the individual is 
free to leave state custody.”336 The court concluded that the 
petitioners might be able to prove facts supporting that 
Pennsylvania owed them affirmative duties of care.337 
The Third Circuit ruled that courts should carefully 
scrutinize the facts in order to determine whether voluntary 
patients are owed affirmative duties, just as the Eighth Circuit 
ruled in Kennedy and implicitly reaffirmed in Shelton.338 But 
while Kennedy required a factual determination of whether the 
state’s actions had “converted” a voluntary patient into an 
involuntary patient,339 the Torisky court did not go so far. The 
Third Circuit’s test asks whether the voluntary patient is free to 
leave.340 Voluntary patients may be restricted from leaving a 
hospital at will without the state initiating formal commitment 
proceedings.341 The Third Circuit’s analysis therefore fits more 
squarely within DeShaney’s functional-custody exception.342 Its 
analysis does not explicitly rely on the voluntary/involuntary 
                                                                                                     
 336. Id. at 447. The court looked at cases including Kennedy v. Schafer, 
discussed supra in section IV.B.2; Monahan v. Dorchester Counseling Center, 
discussed supra in section IV.A.2; and Walton v. Alexander, discussed supra in 
section IV.A.3.  
 337. See id. at 448 (concluding that “a constitutional violation may have 
occurred”).  
 338. See id. at 447 (stating that the court must look “beyond the label of an 
individual’s confinement”); Shelton v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 677 F.3d 837, 
841–42 (8th Cir. 2012) (applying Kennedy’s rule to the facts in the instant case); 
Kennedy v. Schafer, 71 F.3d 292, 296 (8th Cir. 1995) (remanding the case for a 
factual determination of Kathleen’s status), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1018 (1996). 
 339. See supra notes 303–06 and accompanying text (analyzing Kennedy’s 
analysis and ruling). 
 340. See Torisky v. Schweiker, 446 F.3d 438, 447 (3d Cir. 2006) (stating that 
courts must examine the facts of a patient’s custody and determine “whether the 
individual is free to leave state custody”).  
 341. See id. at 446–47 (discussing that patients who voluntarily enter a 
hospital may face restrictions on their ability to leave, and noting that 
Pennsylvania law allows a hospital to keep a voluntary patient in custody for up 
to seventy-two hours). 
 342. See id. at 444 (referencing DeShaney’s rule that the state owes 
affirmative duties to individuals over whom it exercises functional custody).  
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distinction but the court’s inquiries overlap with Kennedy’s de 
facto involuntary commitment analysis.  
V. Concerns about Overreliance on Voluntary/Involuntary 
Distinction 
Given the division among circuits over what analytic method 
courts should use to determine whether voluntary patients are 
owed affirmative duties, this Part suggests that an analysis 
putting less emphasis on voluntary status is appropriate. 
Categorizing patients as either voluntary or involuntary is easy, 
but often fails to accurately and reliably capture the full picture 
of a patient’s relationship with the state.343 This Part considers 
two reasons that a patient’s  voluntary status may not accurately 
describe his relationship to the state: competency and coercion.  
A. Competency: Can Acutely Mentally Ill Patients Give 
Informed Consent? 
Voluntary admission requires that an individual express his 
agreement to be hospitalized by giving informed consent.344 
Unless a court has determined that an individual is incompetent, 
the law presumes that a person can make personal decisions 
regarding medical treatment.345 Competency raises special issues 
in the setting of a psychiatric hospitalization.346  
When a person is acutely ill with a psychiatric illness—to the 
point of requiring inpatient care—is that person competent to 
give informed consent? For most of the twentieth century, all 
                                                                                                     
 343. The concurrence in Walton v. Alexander, 44 F.3d 1297, 1309–10 (5th 
Cir. 1995) (Parker, J., concurring), highlighted the problem with substituting 
voluntary status for a more thorough analysis of the facts. 
 344. See Bruce J. Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment: The 
Distinction Between Assent and Objection, 28 HOUS. L. REV. 15, 15–16 (1991) 
(explaining that informed consent requires: informational disclosure; 
competency; voluntariness; and a decision).  
 345. See id. at 21–22 (discussing the presumption that adults are legally 
competent).  
 346. See id. at 18 (“[C]ompetency is one of the central questions of mental 
health law.”). 
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patients were hospitalized involuntarily, and courts believed that 
patients’ severe psychiatric symptoms rendered them per se 
incompetent.347 The Supreme Court voiced concerns about 
competence and voluntary consent in Zinermon v. Burch.348 In 
that case, a voluntary patient challenged his admission status, 
arguing that he had lacked the capacity to give informed consent 
when he signed his voluntary admission paperwork.349 The Court 
agreed with the patient, reasoning that mental illness, by its very 
nature, “create[s] special problems regarding informed consent,” 
meaning that hospital staff may not be justified in accepting a 
patient’s proffered consent for treatment “at face value.”350  
Generally, competence to make treatment decisions hinges 
on whether a patient can make rational decisions about his 
treatment or whether he can care for himself.351 Making these 
competency determinations imposes considerable burdens on 
clinicians and healthcare facilities.352 Finding a patient 
incompetent often requires clinicians to follow extra procedures 
in the course of providing treatment, because a surrogate decision 
maker may now make the patient’s decisions.353 Patients 
requiring psychiatric hospitalization may be legally incompetent 
because of their acute symptoms, but may nevertheless be treated 
as competent and permitted to sign the paperwork for voluntary 
admission.354  
                                                                                                     
 347. See, e.g., Sporza v. German Sav. Bank, 84 N.E. 406, 408 (N.Y. 1908) 
(describing the state’s history of institutionalizing people adjudicated insane “on 
account of the necessity of protecting them and the public from their disordered 
minds and insane acts”).  
 348. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 138–39 (1990) (affirming that 
petitioner stated a claim for relief in alleging that Florida violated his 
procedural due process rights by admitting him as a voluntary patient, when 
petitioner alleged he was incompetent to give consent at the time of signing the 
admission paperwork).  
 349. Id.  
 350. Id. at 133 n.18.  
 351. See JOHN PARRY, CIVIL MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, EVIDENCE AND 
TESTIMONY 147–49 (2010) (reviewing standards for determining competence to 
make treatment decisions).  
 352. Id. at 143. 
 353. Id. 
 354. See id. (stating that in order to ensure a patient receives a fair 
competency determination, the patient should have a lawyer and access to a 
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In such a situation, the patient’s “voluntary” label threatens 
to mislead a court relying on the voluntary/involuntary 
distinction as a proxy for understanding the relationship between 
a patient and the state. The fact that a patient was voluntarily 
admitted means little when the admission was flawed.355 As the 
Supreme Court pointed out in Zinermon, a legally incompetent 
“voluntary” patient may very well be “unlikely to benefit from the 
voluntary patient’s statutory right to request discharge.”356  
B. Coercion: How do External Forces Influence a Patient’s 
Voluntary Status?  
Related to capacity and informed consent are concerns that 
outside forces—such as professionals, family members, the legal 
system, or mental health policies—influence a patient’s status as 
voluntary or involuntary.  
Apprehensions about clinical staff coercing patients have 
influenced mental health policies since the 1960s.357 As discussed 
                                                                                                     
medical expert). 
 355. See Karna Halverson, Voluntary Admission and Treatment of 
Incompetent Persons with a Mental Illness, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 161, 166 
(2005) (arguing that “allowing the patient to be voluntarily admitted based on 
his or her consent without any competency determination leaves too much room 
for abuse”); Albert B. Palmer & Julian Wohl, Voluntary Admission Forms: Does 
the Patient Know What He’s Signing?, 23 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCH. 38, 38 
(1972) (presenting results from a study, which indicated that only one of forty 
patients could recount the essential provisions of a signed voluntary admission 
form); Donald H. Stone, The Benefits of Voluntary Inpatient Psychiatric 
Hospitalization: Myth or Reality?, 9 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 25, 26 (1999) (“Voluntary 
psychiatric hospitalization should be the result of a competent and informed 
decision arrived at within a non-coercive environment. Hospitalization based on 
anything less is not only involuntary, but it is an infringement of personal 
liberty.”); id. at 36 (“[O]ften a mentally ill person, upon arrival at a psychiatric 
hospital, is disoriented or distressed. Because the patients are disturbed, 
confused, frightened, and distraught, there are indications that they are unable 
to comprehend the major step they take through self-admission.”). 
 356. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 133 (1990). 
 357. See PARRY, supra note 351, at 467 (discussing concerns that patients 
were coerced to accept voluntary hospitalization and care). Beyond questions of 
coercion in the admission process are questions about coercion in treatment. See 
MORRIS, supra note 176, at 171 (stating that professionals have long debated 
whether involuntarily committed individuals may refuse treatment). In general, 
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above, voluntary hospitalization became increasingly popular 
among legal and psychiatric professionals in the last century, and 
an increasing proportion of patients consented to voluntary 
admission during this same period.358 Similarly, as state-hospital 
professionals returned to preferring involuntary admissions, 
more state-hospital patients are being involuntarily admitted.359  
This power to influence patients’ decisions blurs the line 
dividing voluntary and involuntary patients. For example, the 
Supreme Court noted that if a voluntary patient is actually 
incapable of making informed decisions, this patient probably is 
not in a position to exercise his legal rights.360 The hospital 
setting increases the risk that patients’ decisions will be unduly 
influenced.361 Psychiatric clinicians treating acutely ill patients 
approach issues like coercion differently than do constitutional 
scholars.362 Legal scholars tend to focus on broad principles; 
clinicians, however, focus more on individual patients and how 
different actions will affect them.363 Clinicians’ results-based 
                                                                                                     
lawyers have supported the right to refuse in order to prevent a “therapeutic 
orgy,” while mental health professionals have opposed a blanket right in order 
ensure that patients receive necessary treatment. Id. 
 358. See supra notes 164–66 and accompanying text (discussing the 
movement toward voluntary hospitalization). Several states even enacted laws 
creating a rebuttable presumption in favor of voluntary admission. See PARRY, 
supra note 351, at 468 (explaining how some states’ formal policies favor 
voluntary hospitalization); supra note 167 and accompanying text.  
 359. See supra note 183 and accompanying text (discussing the trend back to 
civil commitment in state hospitals).  
 360. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 133 (1990) (stating that 
incompetent patients are “unlikely to benefit from the voluntary patient’s 
statutory right to request discharge”).  
 361. See PARRY, supra note 351, at 149 (stating that “the possibility of 
overreaching and improper influence increases” in inpatient settings). 
 362. See Robert D. Miller, The Continuum of Coercion: Constitutional and 
Clinical Considerations in the Treatment of Mentally Disordered Persons, 74 
DENV. U. L. REV. 1169, 1171–72 (1997) (identifying and discussing multiple 
reasons that legal scholars and psychiatric clinicians approach issues 
differently).  
 363. See id. at 1172 (identifying differences between how legal scholars and 
psychiatric clinicians generally consider issues related to inpatient psychiatric 
care). Legal scholars tend to assume that clients’ wishes should be honored, and 
they focus narrowly on achieving specific goals, like freedom from restraint. Id. 
In contrast, clinicians focus more broadly on providing effective treatment, 
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orientation is arguably reasonable; most involuntary patients 
whose symptoms respond to treatment retrospectively agree that 
the treatment was in their best interest.364 But aside from 
arguments about the utility of coerced treatment, the fact 
remains that coercion is a frequent part of inpatient psychiatric 
care—even voluntary treatment.365 The “voluntary” label masks 
coercive elements, giving the impression that any given voluntary 
patient has fully and competently consented to psychiatric 
hospitalization.366  
Coercion might arise from a variety of sources. The simple 
threat of involuntary commitment leads some patients to sign 
voluntary admission forms.367 State law may incentivize patients 
to avoid involuntary commitment to avoid having a commitment 
order “on the record.”368 Other patients have described feeling 
internally coerced by their psychiatric symptoms.369 The legal 
system’s announced preference for voluntary admissions—as 
expressed by state statutes, court opinions, policy declarations, 
and scholars—may play out by encouraging patients to voluntary 
treatment, but at the expense of enjoying the legal protections 
springing from involuntary status.370 
                                                                                                     
ensuring that a patient continues engaging in treatment after discharge, and 
maintaining a safe and therapeutic environment for all patients. Id. 
 364. See id. at 1174 (reviewing empirical evidence about patients’ attitudes 
after receiving effective treatment). 
 365. See id. (stating that the label “‘voluntary’ is at best misleading and, at 
worst, fraud”). 
 366. Id.  
 367. Id. at 1175; see also Petrila, supra note 178, at 393–94 & n.110 
(reviewing empirical research indicating that psychiatric patients often consent 
to hospitalization based on the threat that if they do not consent, they may be 
civilly committed).  
 368.  See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 330.1464a(1) (2012) (“[T]he court shall 
immediately order the department of state police to enter the [involuntary 
commitment] order into the law enforcement information network. The 
department of state police shall remove the court order from the law 
enforcement information network only upon receipt of a subsequent court order 
for that removal.”). 
 369. Miller, supra note 362, at 1175. 
 370.  See Stone, supra note 355, at 27–29  
The reasons given for voluntary admission include: (1) it involves less 
stigma to the patient; (2) it is less coercive; (3) it allows the patient to 
acknowledge a desire for help and treatment; (4) it respects 
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Coercion is often indirect. Voluntary patients may be 
influenced by their fellow patients.371 Currently, because state 
hospitals are admitting a higher proportion of involuntary, 
dangerous patients, voluntary patients are affected in the 
hospital’s milieu and often receive less clinical attention than 
their more aggressive peers.372 Moreover, many voluntary 
patients only agree to hospitalization in the first place because 
their family or caregiver pressured them to get inpatient 
treatment.373  
These coercive elements, coupled with uncertainties about 
capacity, suggest that the voluntary/involuntary distinction 
cannot validly measure affirmative duties. Coercion and capacity 
go directly to the nature of the hospitalization.374 The label 
“voluntary” is an artificial signifier that communicates limited 
information about whether a patient truly made an informed, 
intelligent decision to be institutionalized. 
                                                                                                     
individual autonomy; (5) it allows the patient the legal right to 
request release; (6) it increases patient involvement and personal 
responsibility; (7) it prevents further deterioration while awaiting the 
civil commitment hearing; (8) it is less time consuming than a 
hearing; (9) involuntary admission forces doctor and patient into an 
adversarial relationship that undermines the therapeutic alliance 
and adversely affects the patient’s participation in treatment; (10) the 
patient is more likely to succeed; (11) there is a perception that the 
stay is shorter; (12) the patient who voluntarily undertakes 
treatment is more likely to be rehabilitated than an involuntary 
patient; (13) it is normalizing since it is very similar to other medical 
admissions.  
The reasons against voluntary admissions include: (1) the potential 
for patient abuse exists; (2) the patient is subject to coercion; (3) the 
patient has fewer opportunities for discharge; (4) the patient is 
admitted under the threat of involuntary commitment; (5) the patient 
does not consult an attorney; (6) there is no adversarial process; 
(7) there is no judicial determination; (8) there is no maximum length 
of stay; (9) the patient is not free to leave; (10) it is unavailable when 
the patient is incapable of being in charge.  
 371. Miller, supra note 362, at 1181.  
 372. Id. 
 373. See id. at 1210 (stating that patients’ families usually favor treatment). 
 374. See id. (stating that “mentally disordered persons are perhaps subject 
to more coercion than most other groups” and this coercion often leads to 
“voluntary” admissions). 
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VI. Proposed Analysis for Determining Duties to a Voluntary 
Patient 
How should courts analyze whether a state-hospital patient 
was owed affirmative duties of care and protection under 
substantive due process? This subpart proposes a three-step 
analysis that avoids the pitfall of overrelying on the voluntary 
distinction.375  
A. The Proposed Analysis 
Courts should not use a patient’s formal voluntary status as 
a proxy for understanding a patient’s relationship to the state. 
The voluntary/involuntary distinction is unreliable and it unduly 
constrains the analysis.376 So how can courts determine which 
voluntary patients are owed Youngberg duties and which are not?  
DeShaney itself suggests a straightforward approach. 
Starting with the general no-duty rule, DeShaney then offered 
three exceptions, each triggering affirmative duties: formal 
custody, functional custody, and state-created danger.377 This 
translates cleanly into a three-part test that considers whether 
any of these exceptions apply when a plaintiff alleges that a State 
violated an affirmative duty.378  
In the state hospital context, this three-part test provides 
courts with a logical method for analyzing affirmative duties. 
When a patient sues the State based on a claim that the state 
failed to provide an affirmative duty of care or protection, the 
court should begin with the general rule that no duty exists.379 
                                                                                                     
 375. Infra Part VI.A.  
 376. See supra Part V (arguing that the voluntary distinction fails as a 
screening tool). 
 377. See supra Part II.B.2 (analyzing DeShaney). 
 378. See Higgs v. Latham, No. 91-5273, 1991 WL 216464, at *6 (6th Cir. Oct. 
24, 1991) (per curiam) (Suhrheinrich, J., concurring) (arguing that the court 
should “go beyond asking whether [the patient] was a voluntary admittee” and 
consider whether the state-created danger or functional custody exceptions 
apply). 
 379. See supra Part II.A (discussing the general no-duty rule in substantive 
due process). 
782 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 725 (2013) 
Before addressing any qualified immunity arguments, the court 
should determine whether the plaintiff has established that he 
was owed affirmative duties at the time of injury.380 Next, the 
court should determine whether one of three exceptions apply.  
First, affirmative duties arise if the state civilly commits the 
patient, taking formal custody.381 Patients with a formal 
“involuntary” status, like Mr. Romeo,382 fall into this exception. 
The voluntary/involuntary distinction is used as a screening tool 
for this exception, sorting out which patients are in the state’s 
formal custody. The distinction does not mean that involuntary 
status is the source of the affirmative duties, only that 
involuntary patients meet the standard for acquiring affirmative 
duties, as decided in Youngberg.  
Second, affirmative duties arise if the state acts to take 
functional custody over a voluntary patient.383 In this analysis, 
the court may look to state actions that potentially converted the 
voluntary hospitalization into a de facto involuntary one. For 
example, courts might find functional custody if the facts show 
that: the patient lacked capacity at the time he signed voluntary 
paperwork; staff coerced the patient to sign voluntary paperwork; 
the patient requested to be discharged and staff declined this 
request; or the staff exercised an extremely high degree of control 
over the patient, with the effect of excluding other people from 
helping the patient. In Higgs, for example, the fact that Mrs. 
Higgs was under a court order for inpatient care and that her 
requests to be discharged were denied could create an affirmative 
duty.384 By contrast, the functional custody exception should fail 
in Monahan unless Mr. Monahan could show that he was coerced 
to remain in the state’s care.385 
                                                                                                     
 380. See Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998) (stating 
that courts should determine whether a plaintiff was owed a constitutional duty 
before reaching qualified immunity arguments). 
 381. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing Youngberg’s rule that involuntary 
commitment triggers affirmative duties). 
 382. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing Youngberg). 
 383. See supra Part II.C.1 (discussing the functional custody exception).  
 384. See supra Part IV.A.1 (discussing Higgs). 
 385. See supra Part IV.A.2 (discussing Monahan). 
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Third, affirmative duties arise if the state created or 
increased the danger that caused the patient’s harm.386 Courts 
again should apply the standards developed within their own 
circuits for state-created danger.387 State-created danger may be 
found if the plaintiff can show that: the state had documented 
awareness either that the patient was substantially at risk to 
injure himself or be injured by another person; the staff cut off 
other sources of aid, such as limiting visitors’ access or not 
informing family about the patient’s risk; and the state, by a 
direct action or policy, increased the likelihood that the patient 
would suffer the foreseen harm. If another patient inflicted the 
injury, courts should scrutinize whether the hospital reasonably 
should have known that the wrongdoer might commit this harm. 
State-created danger might apply in Shelton, given that Brenda 
was an inpatient, cut off from any other sources of aid, and 
hospital staff refused to administer resuscitation—although this 
outcome is less clear.388 Kennedy presents a clearer case of state-
created danger because staff—aware that Kathleen presented 
such a serious risk of suicide that she required constant staff 
presence—failed to follow these ordered precautions.389 The state 
hospital cannot become a “snake pit” without the state acquiring 
affirmative duties.390 
B. Benefits of this Approach 
The Proposed Analysis offers a straightforward application of 
DeShaney and Youngberg, nudging courts to look beyond 
voluntary/involuntary issues. This subpart explains three 
benefits from this analysis: it considers the voluntary/involuntary 
                                                                                                     
 386. See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the state-created danger exception). 
 387. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (reviewing state-created 
danger tests). 
 388.  See supra Part IV.B.2 (discussing Shelton).  
 389.  See supra Part IV.B.2 (discussing Kennedy).  
 390. See Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982) (analogizing 
the state-created danger scenario to the government throwing a man into a 
snake pit). 
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distinction appropriately, it comports squarely with substantive 
due process doctrine, and it does not unduly burden states.391  
1. The Proposed Analysis Appropriately Considers the Voluntary 
Distinction 
A primary benefit of the proposed analysis is that it accords 
the voluntary distinction appropriate weight. The 
voluntary/involuntary distinction determines whether the formal 
custody exception applies. Civilly committed patients fall clearly 
within Youngberg and their affirmative rights are clearly 
established.392  
For voluntary patients, however, the analysis limits the 
importance of the voluntary/involuntary distinction. Consistent 
with most circuits, the analysis rejects the idea that all voluntary 
patients have Youngberg rights.393 But the analysis also rejects 
the idea that formal commitment procedures are required.394 
Instead, the analysis directs courts to apply the functional 
custody and state-created danger exceptions. Circuits cultivated 
these doctrines in the years since DeShaney, and there is no 
reason that courts cannot apply these tests in state hospital 
contexts.395  
                                                                                                     
 391. See infra Parts VI.B.1–3 (discussing each benefit in turn). 
 392. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (explaining Youngberg’s rule). 
 393. See, e.g., Torisky v. Schweiker, 446 F.3d 438, 446 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[A] 
custodial relationship created merely by an individual’s voluntary submission to 
state custody is not a ‘deprivation of liberty’ sufficient to trigger the protections 
of Youngberg.”). 
 394. See id. (rejecting the argument that “a court commitment to state 
custody is a necessary characteristic of a deprivation of liberty sufficient to 
trigger Youngberg[]”).  
 395. See Walton v. Alexander, 44 F.3d 1297, 1309 (5th Cir. 1995) (Parker, J., 
concurring) (“Rather than simply asking whether a person entered state custody 
‘voluntarily,’ we should examine the nature of the custodial relationship that 
existed between the State and the plaintiff.”); Higgs v. Latham, No. 91-5273, 
1991 WL 216464, at *6 (6th Cir. Oct. 24, 1991) (per curiam) (Suhrheinrich, J., 
concurring) (arguing that courts should “go beyond asking whether [the patient] 
was a voluntary admittee” and consider whether the state-created danger or 
functional custody exceptions apply). 
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The proposed analysis protects voluntary patients’ rights. 
Psychiatric patients—both voluntary and involuntary—face 
barriers to vindicating their legal rights.396 And the patients 
labeled “voluntary” may be even more vulnerable, given that 
their admissions may be tainted by coercion or flawed consent.397 
The analysis recognizes this vulnerability and allows courts some 
discretion in ruling on a particular set of facts. This discretion is 
fitting. Substantive due process 
formulates a concept less rigid and more fluid than those 
envisaged in other [constitutional provisions]. Its application 
is less a matter of rule. Asserted denial is to be tested by an 
appraisal of the totality of facts in a given case. That which 
may, in one setting, constitute a denial of fundamental 
fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice, may, in 
other circumstances, and in the light of other considerations, 
fall short of such denial.398 
Tests relying on the voluntary distinction constrain courts by 
obstructing their ability to find affirmative duties in specific 
cases. 
Giving courts more flexibility to find affirmative duties to 
voluntary patients furthers the goals of § 1983. Section 1983 
should not “supplant traditional tort law,”399 but neither should 
§ 1983 claims be rendered useless. As the Supreme Court 
explained in Monroe v. Pape,400 § 1983 claims should 
                                                                                                     
 396. See Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1316 (5th Cir. 1974) 
Mental patients are particularly unlikely to be aware of their legal 
rights. They are likely to have especially limited access to legal 
assistance. Individual suits may be protracted and expensive, and 
individual mental patients may therefore be deterred from bringing 
them. And individual suits may produce distortive therapeutic effects 
within an institution, since a staff may tend to give especially good—
or especially harsh—treatment to patients the staff expects or knows 
to be litigious. 
 397. See supra Part V (discussing how issues related to competence and 
coercion may render a formal voluntary admission status misleading).  
 398. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942), overruled on other grounds by 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 399. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986). 
 400. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) rev’d in part, Monell v. Dep’t of 
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
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supplement state law claims.401 If a voluntary patient makes out 
sufficient facts to convince the court that the state owed him 
affirmative duties, he must be able to enforce this right.402  
Moreover, § 1983’s remedies—the injunction and litigation 
costs, specifically—are powerful and important tools for 
prompting institutional reform in state hospitals.403 As state 
hospitals evolve by closing down beds, admitting more criminal 
defendants, and treating more dangerous and more seriously ill 
patients,404 § 1983 should retain its power as a sword. The 
Supreme Court recently indicated that courts cannot limit the 
injunction’s potency by denying this relief to a broad class of 
people.405 The analysis offers voluntary patients the chance to 
persuade a court to use this sword. 
2. The Proposed Analysis Retains Doctrinal Integrity 
The proposed analysis is also faithful to existing law. First, 
with regard to substantive due process, doctrinal integrity is 
imperative because substantive due process is vulnerable to 
                                                                                                     
 401. See id. at 171 (concluding that Congress intended for the Act to “give a 
remedy to parties deprived of constitutional rights”). After reviewing legislative 
history, the Court found that Congress planned for the Act to serve three 
purposes: to override invidious state laws, to provide remedy when state law 
insufficiently protected rights, and to provide additional remedies when state 
remedies were inadequate or impractical. Id. at 173–74. 
 402. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) (“The very essence of 
civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the 
protection of the laws.”). 
 403. See, e.g., United States v. Tennessee, 615 F.3d 646, 648 (6th Cir. 2010) 
(refusing to vacate outstanding orders stemming from a district court’s original 
1993 injunction against a state hospital that was violating patients’ substantive 
due process rights); Thomas v. Flaherty, 902 F.2d 250, 251–52 (4th Cir. 1990) 
(upholding a district court’s order for injunctive relief for a class of patients 
whose constitutional rights were violated by the “deficient care” in state 
hospitals). 
 404. See supra Part III.B (discussing changes in state hospitals since the 
1950s). 
 405. See eBay v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393 (2006) (rejecting 
“expansive principles suggesting that injunctive relief could not issue in a broad 
swath of cases”). 
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confusion and misapplication.406 Courts frequently approach 
claims purporting to potentially expand individual rights with 
“wariness and even embarrassment.”407 By deriving its analysis 
directly from DeShaney, the analysis avoids arbitrarily expanding 
substantive due process’s protections. After focusing courts’ 
attention through DeShaney’s lens, the analysis points to specific 
factors relevant to state hospitals. For example, questions about 
coercion and competence raise significant concerns in state 
hospitals, but are probably irrelevant in contexts lacking any 
potential for the victim to “consent to” the state’s control. The 
analysis captures a clear picture of a patient’s relationship to the 
state, rather than a mere glimpse of voluntary status. 
Second, the proposed analysis is more consistent with legal 
doctrine related to custody than are the status-driven approaches 
some circuits currently apply. While the Supreme Court has not 
addressed whether voluntary patients are “in custody,” it has 
offered guidance on this question in the Fourth Amendment 
context.408 Custody assessments—at least for Fourth Amendment 
purposes—require courts to approach the situation from the 
individual’s point of view, not the state’s.409 How do these rules 
relate to custody for substantive due process purposes? The Sixth 
Circuit argued that in the context of voluntary patients, custody 
claims under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments should be 
treated identically.410 The Third Circuit similarly ruled in Torisky 
that affirmative duties must depend on whether the patient is 
free to leave.411 Because custody turns on the individual’s 
objective perspective, in state hospitals, a patient’s legal 
                                                                                                     
 406. See Richard H. Fallon, Some Confusions about Due Process, Judicial 
Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 309 (1993) (“Due 
process doctrine subsists in confusion.”).  
 407. Id.  
 408. See Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 (1994) (per curiam) 
(stating that whether or not a person is “in custody” depends on the perspective 
of a reasonable person in the suspect’s position). 
 409. Id.  
 410. See Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d 673, 683 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(“Differentiating Fourteenth Amendment cases from . . . Fourth Amendment 
[cases] based on the voluntary or involuntary nature of the state’s custody would 
lead to arguably inconsistent results.”). 
 411. See supra note 337 (giving Torisky’s ruling). 
788 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 725 (2013) 
voluntary status should not be conflated with his reasonably 
perceived status. If a voluntary patient reasonably believes that 
he has no right to leave, his “voluntary” label means little. 
Third, the proposed analysis offers courts a coherent 
framework for analysis. This point is highlighted by Kennedy. In 
that case, the Eighth Circuit found affirmative duties by 
determining that Kathleen, while formally a voluntary patient, 
may have been constructively involuntary.412 By stretching the 
category of “involuntary” patients in this way, the decision 
unnecessarily muddies the law. The court’s rationale that “[f]acts 
change, and legal status follows facts,”413 would suggest that if 
the facts of Kennedy remained the same, but Kathleen had not 
killed herself, she nevertheless would have been involuntary—
but without any of the due process protections afforded by the 
civil commitment process. Zinermon directly prohibits such a 
result.414 The Kennedy court’s analysis comports more squarely 
within the proposed analysis, allowing it to neatly find 
affirmative duties arising from state-created danger, rather than 
stretching the voluntary/involuntary distinction beyond its fibers. 
3. The Proposed Analysis Will Not Unduly Expand Affirmative 
Duties 
Allowing some voluntary patients Youngberg rights is 
unlikely to produce intolerable policy results. States frequently 
assert that imposing liability will force unsustainably weighty 
burdens on them and cause a disastrous fallout.415 These 
concerns should be viewed with a critical eye. For example, some 
advocates charge that states will stop admitting voluntary 
                                                                                                     
 412.  Kennedy v. Shafer, 71 F.3d 1522, 295 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 
U.S. 1018 (1996).  
 413.  Id. at 296.  
 414.  Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 138–39 (1990) (ruling that voluntary 
admission proceedings cannot substitute for involuntary commitment).  
 415. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 16, Schafer v. Kennedy, No. 
95-1697, 1996 WL 33439744, at *16 (Apr. 19, 1996) (arguing that the Eighth 
Circuit’s ruling that a de facto involuntary patient is owed affirmative duties 
incentivizes states “to deny care to the mentally ill”), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1018 
(1996).  
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patients altogether because the risk of liability “is too great to 
jeopardize” state resources.416 Aware that current “voluntary” 
patients might be relabeled “involuntary” by some court in the 
future, the argument goes, hospital staff will be left unsure 
whether they owe affirmative duties.417  
To be sure, increasing potential liability in state hospitals 
will produce corollary burdens. Underfunded state mental health 
systems may be forced to spend their tight budgets on legal fees 
and judgments.418 State hospital workers would also face 
increased exposure to personal liability, and may be unable to 
obtain insurance coverage for constitutional violations.419 
When considered in light of the current state hospital 
system,420 however, these concerns appear overblown. First, it 
seems implausible that states will stop admitting and treating 
voluntary patients. History belies such an argument. Youngberg 
explicitly granted affirmative duties to every involuntary patient, 
but states did not react by refusing to treat involuntary patients, 
a decision that would have been within states’ discretion.421 Why 
would a different result follow if some voluntary patients are 
granted affirmative rights? Hypothetically, if states did react by 
shutting their doors to voluntary patients, then they would 
correspondingly open their doors to more involuntary patients.422 
The result would be that every patient would possess affirmative 
Youngberg rights.423 Allowing voluntary patients to establish 
                                                                                                     
 416. Id.  
 417. Id. at *16–17. 
 418. See id. at *17–19 (arguing that state budgets will suffer potentially 
untenable consequences if voluntary patients are found to have affirmative 
rights). 
 419. See APPELBAUM & GUTHEIL, supra note 46, at 138 (discussing due 
process claims against individual clinicians). 
 420. See supra Part III.B (discussing how state hospitals evolved in recent 
decades). 
 421. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing Youngberg); see also supra note 183 
and accompanying text (noting that state hospitals are trending toward 
involuntary patients).  
 422. See SAMHSA FUNDING REPORT, supra note 175, at 69–70 (stating that 
many states currently face a shortage of state hospital beds).  
 423. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316–17 (1982) (ruling that 
states owe affirmative duties under substantive due process to involuntarily 
committed individuals). 
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affirmative constitutional rights, then, should not be precluded 
out of concerns for state budgets.  
Second, state actors are protected by the deferential 
professional judgment standard for imposing liability.424 The 
professional judgment standard is more deferential than the 
“reasonable care” standard in malpractice claims.425 The 
reasonable care standard imposes liability if a defendant’s 
conduct deviates at all from what a reasonable professional would 
do; the professional judgment standard imposes liability only for 
a substantial deviation.426 The Supreme Court chose this 
standard in Youngberg to avoid overly burdening states.427 The 
Court reasoned that the professional judgment standard protects 
hospitals and individual clinicians by relieving them of a burden 
“to make each decision in the shadow of an action for damages.”428 
With this standard’s protections, state actors will be insulated 
from an uncontrolled new wave of liability. 
VII. Conclusions 
The government owes us nothing. DeShaney highlighted this 
general principle with its unrelentingly formal analysis of a 
shockingly tragic case.429 And DeShaney’s message has been 
received in lower courts.430  
                                                                                                     
 424.  See id. at 324 (“In determining whether the State has met its 
obligations . . . decisions made by the appropriate professional are entitled to a 
presumption of correctness.”).  
 425. See PARRY, supra note 351, at 652 (discussing both standards). 
 426. Id. 
 427. See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 324 (“Such a presumption is necessary to 
enable institutions of this type—often, overcrowded and understaffed—to 
continue to function.”). 
 428. Id. at 325.  
 429. See supra Parts II.A, II.B.2 (discussing the no-duty rule and DeShaney). 
 430. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, § 3.09[B] (“DeShaney has generated an 
unusually large volume of important lower federal court rulings.”); see also Doe 
v. Milwaukee Cnty., 712 F. Supp. 1370, 1371 (W.D. Wis. 1989) (“Joshua 
DeShaney will never know it, unfortunately, but he has had a dramatic impact 
on constitutional law. The case that grew out of a tragedy . . . is already 
affecting law suits across the country.”). 
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But amidst this post-DeShaney storm, courts must not 
overlook the exceptional cases. Sometimes the government does 
owe a duty to protect or care for individuals.431 State hospitals 
present a complicated context for evaluating when affirmative 
duties apply, and state-hospital patients are particularly 
vulnerable.432 A patient’s relationship with the state is more 
complicated than his voluntary status. Courts falter when they 
conflate a patient’s voluntary status—either formal or de facto—
with a sound legal test for affirmative duties.  
Voluntary status should not preclude affirmative duties. 
Courts should have some modicum of discretion to provide a just 
ruling in the case at hand.433 The proposed analysis suggested in 
this Note offers a flexible standard without sacrificing doctrinal 
integrity.434  
Stepping back and reflecting on DeShaney and its wake, it’s 
almost surprising to remember that some of the most important 
facts remain a mystery. Wisconsin never explained why it chose 
not to intervene to protect little Joshua, even as the social worker 
dutifully chronicled her suspicions “in detail that seems almost 
eerie.”435 No explanation was required once the Court found that 
no duty existed.436  
But DeShaney explicitly demanded that sometimes an 
explanation is needed. Sometimes state actors should be called 
upon to explain their decisions. In cases involving state-hospital 
patients, courts should not gloss over the special issues that may 
                                                                                                     
 431. See supra Parts II.B.1, II.C.1–2 (discussing Youngberg, the functional 
custody exception, and the state-created danger exception). 
 432. See supra Parts III, V (reviewing mental health law and the nature of 
state hospitals). 
 433. See, e.g., BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 66 
(1921) 
There is an old legend that on one occasion God prayed, and his 
prayer was “Be it my will that my justice be ruled by my mercy.” That 
is a prayer which we all need to utter at times when the demon of 
formalism tempts the intellect with the lure of scientific order. 
 434. See supra Part VI (containing the proposed analysis and arguing its 
strengths). 
 435. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 209 
(1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
 436. Id. 
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arise. Courts should ask whether the state created a duty, 
whether by civilly committing a patient, by exercising functional 
custody, or by creating a danger. When the government takes 
those actions against us, then it does owe us something.  
